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Abstract 
 
The Court of Arbitration for Sport is an arbitral tribunal, which was originally created with the aim of 
resolving disputes that have some connection to sports. Its predominant dispute settlement method is 
arbitration. Thus far the Court of Arbitration for Sport has achieved a great reputation for being a highly 
fair, effective and respected forum for the settlement of sports disputes in a relatively inexpensive and 
speedy manner since its inception in 1984. 
 
This paper seeks to test CAS’s arbitral procedure to see whether or not certain traditional elements of 
arbitration are present and, as a result, whether or not the various benefits of arbitration are offered to 
sports disputants. The elements discussed are: party consent, party autonomy, institutional independence, 
independence and impartiality of arbitrators, privacy and confidentiality, and enforcement of awards. Also, 
this paper provides recommendations where it has found that CAS ought to reflect the listed elements 
better, so that sports disputants can extract more advantages offered by arbitration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding title page, table of contents, contents of this page, list of 
abbreviations, footnotes (but including substantive footnotes), appendix and 
bibliography) comprises approximately 14,972 words. 
 
 
Subject and Topics 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) — International Olympic Committee (IOC) — 
International Arbitration — Dispute Settlement — Sports 
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List of Abbreviations 
   
ANOC  Association of National Olympic Committees 
ARISF  Association of IOC Recognised International Sports 
Federations 
CAS  Court of Arbitration for Sport 
CAS Code  Code of Sports-related Arbitration 
CPC  Swiss Civil Procedure Code 
FIFA  Fédération Internationale de Football Association 
ICAS  International Council of Arbitration for Sport 
ICC  International Commercial Chamber 
ICC Court  ICC’s International Court of Arbitration 
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IOC  International Olympic Committee 
NOC  National Olympic Committee 
New York Convention  New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 
Olympic Committees  IOC, Summer Olympics Association, Winter Olympics 
Association and the ANOC 
PILS  Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private International Law 
1987 
Summer Olympics 
Association 
 Association of Summer Olympic International Federations 
Swiss Federal Tribunal  Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland 
UEFA  Union of European Football Associations 
UNCITRAL  United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation 
WADA  World Anti-Doping Agency 
Winter Olympics 
Association 
 Association of Winter Olympic International Federations 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organisation 
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I Introduction 
 
The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) is a specialised arbitral tribunal, which was 
originally created to avoid the intervention of State courts in the resolution of sports-
related disputes.1 To encourage more sports disputants to bring forward their claims, CAS 
was meant to offer a quick, inexpensive and flexible procedure for the resolution of 
disputes independently from other sports bodies.2 Using the words of CAS’s originator 
Juan Antonio Samaranch, CAS was ultimately hoped to be the “supreme court of world 
sport”.3  
 
This paper seeks to test CAS’s arbitral procedure to see whether or not certain traditional 
elements of arbitration are present and, as a result, whether or not the various benefits of 
arbitration are offered to sports disputants.  
 
To introduce the topic, an explanation is provided of world sport organisation and sports 
dispute settlement followed by a more informative section on CAS. The next segment 
explains what arbitration generally is and, more importantly, why arbitration is the 
preferred method of dispute settlement for sports disputes. The main body then discusses 
CAS’s arbitral procedure tested against the following elements of arbitration: party 
consent, party autonomy, institutional independence, independence and impartiality of 
arbitrators, privacy and confidentiality, and enforcement of awards. Where it has been 
  
1  Antonio Rigozzi, Erika Hasler and Michael Noth “Part I – Introduction to the CAS Code” in 
Manuel Arroyo (ed) Arbitration in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer Law 
International, The Netherlands, 2013) 885 at [1]. 
2  Matthieu Reeb “The Role And Functions Of The Court Of Arbitration For Sport (CAS)” in Ian S 
Blackshaw, Robert C R Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
1984–2004 (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2006) 31 at 32; and see also Despina Mavromati and 
Matthieu Reeb “Introduction: The International Council of Arbitration for Sport (ICAS) and the 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): 30 Years of History” in The Code of the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials (Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2015) 1 at 1. 
3  Juan Antonio Samaranch quoted in H E Judge Kéba Mbaye “Foreword” in Matthieu Reeb (ed) 
Digest of CAS Awards II 1998–2000 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002) xi at xii; and 
see also Richard H McLaren “Twenty-Five Years Of The Court Of Arbitration For Sport: A Look 
In The Rear-View Mirror” (2010) 20(2) Marq Sports L Rev 305 at 306. 
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found that CAS ought to reflect the listed elements better, recommendations are made 
which, if implemented, would help sports disputants extract more benefits of arbitration 
that users of arbitration in other contexts currently extract.  
 
II General Background 
A Understanding the Organisation of World Sport 
 
It is best to view the whole system of world sport through the eyes of an athlete, in order 
to appreciate the complexity of the organisation of world sport. An athlete is typically a 
member of a sports club and any one club would usually have multiple members.4 
Multiple sports clubs create a federation,5 which then cumulatively with other federations 
create national federations.6 National federations become members of international 
federations, which together form an international system of world sport.7 
 
The relationship between an athlete and his or her club, between clubs and federations, 
and between national and international federations is contractual in nature.8 Through his 
or her membership with a particular club,9 an athlete is granted a licence, by a federation 
to which the club belongs, which allows the athlete to participate in the various events the 
federation organises.10 
 
The world of sport becomes more complex because there is a hierarchical organisational 
structure within the international system, with the International Olympic Committee 
  
4  See Mauro Rubino-Sammartano “The Sports Arbitral Tribunal” in International Arbitration: Law 
and Practice (3rd ed, JurisNet, New York, 2014) 1683 at 1685. 
5  At 1685. 
6  At 1684. 
7  At 1684. 
8  At 1685. 
9  At 1685. 
10  At 1685, n 7. 
8 IS THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT REALLY ARBITRATION? 
(IOC) playing a significant role in world sport.11 The IOC was created in 1894 and has 
now become an international, not-for-profit organisation based in Lausanne, 
Switzerland.12 It is the supreme authority for the Olympic Movement because it is 
effectively the guardian of the Olympic Charter.13 The IOC is famous for organising 
Olympic Games every four years in summer and winter seasons,14 and Youth Olympic 
Games since 2010.15 The IOC is a nongovernmental organisation: members are elected to 
represent the IOC in the members’ countries, as opposed to being representatives of their 
countries in the IOC.16  
 
The IOC’s significant power stems from the fact that, inter alia, it:17 
(a) recognises which sport is an Olympic sport;  
(b) chooses Olympic cities; 
(c) recognises other sports international federations; and  
(d) recognises National Olympic Committees.  
 
A National Olympic Committee (NOC) is a body independent from its country’s 
government with the exclusive power to send teams and athletes to participate in the 
  
11  See also David Thorpe and others “Organisational Structure” in Sports Law (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, South Melbourne (Victoria), 2013) 7 at 14–17. 
12  International Olympic Committee “Factsheet: The Olympic Movement” (16 April 2015) Olympic 
Movement <www.olympic.org> at 1. 
13  At 1; International Olympic Committee “Olympic Charter” (September 2015) Olympic Movement 
<www.olympic.org> at r 1.1 [Olympic Charter]; and see also Bruno Simma “The Court Of 
Arbitration For Sport” in Ian S Blackshaw, Robert C R Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) The 
Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004 (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2006) 21 at 22–23. 
14  International Olympic Committee “The Modern Olympic Games” (2012) Olympic Movement 
<www.olympic.org> at 3; and see generally Olympic Movement “Olympic Games” 
<www.olympic.org>. 
15  International Olympic Committee “The Youth Olympic Games Facts and Figures” (25 June 2014) 
Olympic Movement <www.olympic.org> at 1. 
16  International Olympic Committee “Factsheet: IOC Members” (July 2014) Olympic Movement 
<www.olympic.org> at 1; Olympic Charter, above n 13, at r 16(1.4); and see generally Olympic 
Movement “The IOC: The Organisation - Members” <www.olympic.org>. 
17  Olympic Charter, above n 13, at rr 18 and 19; and see also Simma, above n 13, at 22–23. 
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Olympic Games.18 There are currently 206 NOCs representing different countries,19 
collectively making an association (ANOC).20  
 
As listed above, the IOC recognises NOCs, international federations and the sports those 
federations represent,21 thereby highlighting that the IOC is truly the supreme authority in 
world sport.22 More importantly, the IOC recognises other Olympic Movement members 
such as the Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (Summer 
Olympics Association) and Association of Winter Olympic International Federations 
(Winter Olympics Association).23 Starting from now, this paper will refer to the IOC, 
Summer and Winter Olympics Associations, and the ANOC collectively as ‘the Olympic 
Committees’. 
 
This section attempted to highlight that the organisation of world sport is very complex, 
especially if viewed from the eyes of an athlete.24 It is important to maintain connections 
between parties in the chain of world sport in order for the whole system to function — 
next section explains how those connections can be kept well together. 
B Sports Dispute Settlement 
 
Before explaining what dispute settlement methods are available to sport disputants, it is 
important to appreciate their need for them. Despite the development of modern rules for 
sport since the middle of 19th century, only since 1980s has there been great 
commercialisation and professionalisation of sports boosted by the fact that Olympic 
Games have become officially open to professional athletes, as opposed to just amateur 
  
18  At 22; and Olympic Charter, above n 13, at rr 27(3) and 27(6). 
19  Olympic Movement “Countries” <www.olympic.org>. 
20  Simma, above n 13, at 22–23. 
21  See generally Olympic Movement “The IOC: Governance Of The Olympic Movement -
Recognised Organisations” <www.olympic.org>. 
22  See also James A R Nafziger “Introduction” in James A R Nafziger (ed) Transnational Law of 
Sports (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013) xiii at xvi–xvii. 
23  Olympic Movement “The IOC: International Sports Federations - Mission” <www.olympic.org>. 
24  See Annex 1 for a diagram with an example of New Zealand Rugby Union. 
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athletes, in 1984.25 Consequently, sports have become the main employment, source of 
income and career for athletes, and millions of dollars have become at stake for a 
multitude of other interested parties trying to protect their legal rights in, for instance, 
trade marks, designs, other items of intellectual property, player transfers, sponsorship 
contracts, organisation of tournaments, broadcasting rights, betting, provision of 
telecommunications and much more.26 In such a context it is easy to see that adequate 
settlement of sports disputes is not a frivolity, but actually a bare necessity. 
 
In order to resolve a sports dispute, the disputing party would typically turn to the sports 
club or federation first. The primary methods of dispute settlement are mediation and 
negotiation because many clubs and federations would usually have internal procedures 
in place for resolving the various types of conflicts.27 However, for disciplinary measures 
against athletes — for the breach of rules in respect of on-field and off-field conduct, and 
for breaching the rules contained within the governing charter of the organisation — most 
rules of the sports-governing bodies ordinarily state that a disciplinary tribunal would 
decide on the appropriate measure.28 Such disciplinary tribunals are established through a 
sports parent organisation; therefore, the dispute resolution procedure is still internal in its 
nature.29 Clearly, however, such method of dispute resolution resembles adjudication 
better than mediation or negotiation. 
 
If a sports disputant is dissatisfied with the decision rendered via internal means, 
litigation in State courts is the next available dispute resolution method; but litigation is 
not without its own difficulties.30 In fact, in 1980s many athletes began challenging their 
doping suspensions before their national courts; the damages claimed were so high that it 
  
25  See David Thorpe and others “Introduction” in Sports Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 
South Melbourne (Victoria), 2013) 1 at 3–4. 
26  See generally at 3–4. 
27  See Nafziger, above n 22, at xx–xxi. 
28  David Thorpe and others “Domestic Disciplinary Tribunals” in Sports Law (2nd ed, Oxford 
University Press, South Melbourne (Victoria), 2013) 31 at 32; and see generally Michael Beloff 
and others “Disciplinary Proceedings in Sport” in Sports Law (2nd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2012) 188 at [7.1]–[7.224]. 
29  Thorpe and others, above n 28, at 33. 
30  At 66 and 68–69. 
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could mean bankruptcy for the sports-governing bodies that issued the challenged 
decisions (an illogical result for many).31  
 
Moreover, State courts have shown their reluctance to interfere with the determinations 
rendered by sports bodies32 saying that “in general Courts should be a last resort for the 
determination of club and association disputes”33 unless there are “flagrant cases of 
injustice, including corruption or bias”.34 The most probable reason for such reluctance 
was the “considerable legal uncertainty which surrounded sporting disputes when they 
came before the courts”,35 making it difficult to decide in most common law countries 
whether a court would consider it had jurisdiction over sports disputes.36Also, a generally 
accepted principle had developed called autonomy of sport, which was recognised by 
national courts as evidenced by their reduced intervention in the affairs of “the 
autonomous preserve of national and international federations”.37 
 
With litigation being the last recourse, arbitration became a very appealing alternative 
method of dispute resolution, which could issue binding awards independent of sports-
governing bodies. Certain States — Germany, France, UK, Canada and New Zealand — 
have set up sports tribunals that typically offer arbitration and mediation services for 
resolution of sports disputes.38 Additionally, there have been international arbitral 
institutions set up for specific sports (eg Basketball Arbitral Tribunal).39  
  
31  Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [1]. 
32  See Nafziger, above n 22, at xxi–xxii. 
33  Cox v Caloundra Golf Club Inc Supreme Court of Queensland, 27 September 1995 at 9. 
34  Calvin v Carr [1979] 1 NSWLR 1 at 12. 
35  Paul David “The Rise of Arbitration in the World of Sport” (15 July 2013) 
<www.pauldavid.co.nz> at [3]. 
36  At [5]. 
37  Louise Reilly “An Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) & the Role of National 
Courts in International Sports Disputes” (2012) 1 J Disp Resol 63 at 77–78. 
38  Deutsches Sportschiedsgericht <www.dis-sportschiedsgericht.de>; France Olympique “Juridique: 
Chambre arbitrale du sport” <www.franceolympique.com>; Sport Resolutions 
<www.sportresolutions.co.uk>; Sport Dispute Resolution Centre of Canada <www.crdsc-
sdrcc.ca>; and Sports Tribunal of New Zealand <www.sportstribunal.org.nz>. 
39  Rubino-Sammartano, above n 4, at 1710–1715; and see FIBA “Activities & Services: Basketball 
Arbitral Tribunal (BAT)” <www.fiba.com>. 
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Nevertheless, CAS — originally set up to avoid the interference of national courts in 
sports disputes — is an institution that has somewhat altered the ground in favour of 
arbitration because it is the most widely used institution for sports dispute resolution.40 
The main idea behind CAS was that its awards would be just as final and binding as 
decisions of a State court, thereby preventing sports disputants from appearing in their 
national courts.41 Moreover, CAS achieved significant prominence because it may hear 
appeals from other sports arbitral tribunals in certain circumstances (eg an athlete can 
appeal New Zealand sports tribunal’s award to CAS).42 It is important to have a good 
understanding of CAS as a whole; therefore, next section discusses CAS in more detail. 
C Overview of CAS 
 
CAS is an arbitral tribunal, headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, which began its 
operations in June 1984 after being legally created by the IOC.43 Currently CAS has two 
additional permanent branches situated in Sydney, Australia and New York, USA.44 CAS 
is governed by the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (CAS Code), made up of Statutes 
and Procedural Rules, which effectively acts as its constitution.45 The CAS Court Office 
primarily handles CAS’s day-to-day administration of cases.46  
 
  
40  See Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [2]. 
41  At [1]. 
42  Sports Tribunal of New Zealand “Rules Of The Sports Tribunal Of New Zealand 2012” (6 March 
2012) <www.sportstribunal.org.nz> at r 28(b); and see also Rubino-Sammartano, above n 4, at 
1715. 
43  Mavromati and Reeb, above n 2, at 2; and Ian Blackshaw “Introductory Remarks” in Ian S 
Blackshaw, Robert C R Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
1984–2004 (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2006) 1 at 1. 
44  At 1; Mavromati and Reeb, above n 2, at 6; and see generally Thorpe and others, above n 11, at 
17–21. 
45  TAS/CAS “Arbitration: Code: Procedural Rules” (2013) <www.tas-cas.org> [CAS Code]; and see 
also Mavromati and Reeb, above n 2. 
46  See CAS Code, above n 45, at S22; and see also Reeb, above n 2, at 36. 
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As long as there is agreement between sports disputants, CAS offers services in 
mediation and arbitration.47 Once CAS declares its jurisdiction over the submitted 
dispute, any attempt to bring the same claim in national courts is likely to be met by an 
application of stay based on the fact that the parties agreed to arbitration.48 The scope of 
disputes that CAS may hear is incredibly broad:49 
 
Such disputes may involve matters of principle relating to sport or matters of 
pecuniary or other interests relating to the practice or the development of sport and 
may include, more generally, any activity or matter related or connected to sport. 
 
In practice, CAS has never declared itself as lacking jurisdiction on the ground of a 
dispute not being related to sport.50 In principle, two types of disputes are submitted to 
CAS:  
(1) commercial disputes typically involving matters relating to contracts (eg 
sponsorship, staging of sports events, television rights sales, relations between 
athletes, coaches and clubs, and player transfers); and  
(2) disputes relating to decisions of other sports bodies, in particular disciplinary 
disputes (eg violence on the play field, abuse of referees and doping).51  
CAS panels hear those disputes via either the Ordinary Division: where disputes are 
originally submitted with CAS through the ordinary sole instance procedure, or via its 
Appeals Division: where disputes concern the decisions of federations, associations or 
other sports-related bodies.52 
 
Another division of CAS called the ad hoc division, which abides by its own arbitration 
rules in addition to the CAS Code rules, has been operational since 1996.53 The ad hoc 
  
47  CAS Code, above n 45, at S1 and S12; and TAS/CAS “Arbitration: Ad hoc rules for the Olympic 
Games” <www.tas-cas.org> [Ad Hoc Rules]. 
48  David, above n 35, at [17]. 
49  CAS Code, above n 45, at R27. 
50  TAS/CAS “General Information: History of the CAS” <www.tas-cas.org>. 
51  TAS/CAS, above n 50; and see also Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [13]. 
52  CAS Code, above n 45, at S20. 
53  Ad Hoc Rules, above n 47. 
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division was tasked with settling disputes finally and within a 24-hour time frame, and 
pursuing this aim it enjoys a special procedure, which is simple, flexible, and free of 
charge.54 CAS’s ad hoc division has been created for each and every edition of the 
summer and winter Olympic Games since 1996, for Commonwealth Games since 1998, 
for UEFA European Championships since 2000, for FIFA World Cup since 2006 and for 
Asian Games since 2014.55  
  
The Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland (Swiss Federal Tribunal) is the only court that 
can review CAS awards because the seat of every dispute is in Switzerland.56 For 
international arbitration57  — where at least one party has its domicile or habitual 
residence outside Switzerland — a challenge to the award can be brought on the very 
narrow grounds listed in art 190(2) of Switzerland’s Federal Code on Private 
International Law (PILS):58  
(a) the improper constitution of the tribunal or improper appointment of the sole 
arbitrator;59 
(b) wrong findings of the arbitral tribunal on jurisdiction;60 
(c) an award made on claims beyond those submitted to the tribunal or a failure to 
rule on one of the claims;61  
  
54  See McLaren, above n 3, at 310–315. 
55  Mavromati and Reeb, above n 2, at 7; Georg von Segesser and Aileen Truttmann “Swiss and 
Swiss-based Arbitral Institutions” in Elliott Geisinger and Nathalie Voser (eds) International 
Arbitration in Switzerland: A Handbook for Practitioners (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International, The 
Netherlands, 2013) 275 at 297; and see Ian Blackshaw “ADR And Sport: Settling Disputes 
Through The Court Of Arbitration For Sport, The FIFA Dispute Resolution Chamber, And The 
WIPO Arbitration & Mediation Centre” (2013) 24(1) Marq Sports L Rev 1 at 15–16. 
56  CAS Code, above n 45, at S1. 
57  Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [19]. 
58  Manuel Arroyo “Article 190” in Manuel Arroyo (ed) Arbitration in Switzerland: The 
Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2013) 204 at [3]; see also 
Antonio Rigozzi “Challenging Awards of the Court of Arbitration for Sport” (2010) 1(1) JIDS 217 
at 219; and see also Stephan Netzle “Appeals against Arbitral Awards by the CAS” (2011) 2 CAS 
Bull 19 at 21–22. 
59  Compare BGE vom 9 October 2012 (4A_110/2012) in (2013) 31 ASA Bull 174; and compare 
BGE vom 29 May 2013 (4A_620/2012) in (2014) 32 ASA Bull 57. 
60  Compare BGE vom 20 June 2013 (4A_682/2012) in (2014) 32 ASA Bull 305; and compare BGE 
vom 17 January 2013 (4A_244/2012). 
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(d) the violation of either the principle of equality of parties or their right to be 
heard;62 and  
(e) violation of Swiss public policy.63  
But no challenge can be brought if such parties have expressly excluded all setting aside 
of proceedings in their arbitration agreement.64 
 
However, domestic rules apply for domestic arbitration — where no party has its 
domicile or habitual residence outside of Switzerland — unless those parties have 
excluded domestic rules in favour of PILS.65 The difference in treatment of Swiss parties 
vis-à-vis non-Swiss parties is discussed in more detail later.66 
 
Notwithstanding the review system against its awards, CAS achieved a great reputation 
for being a highly fair, effective, and respected forum for the settlement of sports disputes 
in a relatively inexpensive and speedy manner since its inception in 1984.67 The rising 
popularity of CAS arbitration measured by its use  — 1 case in 1986, 75 cases in 2000 
and 407 registered cases in 2013 — would only confirm CAS’s well-known title badge as 
the supreme court of world sport.68 As one commentator said:69  
 
… there has been little general objection to a system which sees the “day in court” 
for an athlete like Floyd Landis or Oscar Pistorius (in relation to his running blades) 
take place before CAS, and not before a national court. The underlying reason for 
this has, perhaps, been the general acceptance, at national and international level of 
                                                                                                                                                 
61  Compare BGE vom 29 April 2013 (4A_730/2012) in (2014) 32 ASA Bull 68; and compare BGE 
vom 10 December 2012 (4A_635/2012). 
62  Compare BGE vom 11 June 2014 (4A_178/2014); and compare BGE vom 5 August 2013 
(4A_274/2013). 
63  Compare BGE vom 27 March 2013 (4A_448/2013). 
64  CAS Code, above n 45, at R46 and R59. 
65  Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [19]. 
66  See Part IV.E.2: Criticism of the seat at 50–51. 
67  Blackshaw, above n 43, at 1; and see also Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [2]. 
68  TAS/CAS “General Information: Statistics 1986–2013” <www.tas-cas.org>. 
69  David, above n 35, at [25] (footnotes omitted). 
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the need to have specialist tribunals for sports-related disputes, and the growing trust 
which is placed in arbitration generally, and in CAS specifically. 
 
However, over the years there have been multiple cases, which might shake the trust 
placed in CAS. Those cases, discussed or referred to in the body of the text, would 
certainly make one wonder whether CAS offers the benefits of arbitration that should be 
reasonably available to sports disputants, especially in a context where for many CAS is 
the last available forum for dispute resolution.70 But before diving into a discussion of 
CAS’s status as an arbitration court, it is important to explain what arbitration generally 
is, in order to appreciate why it is the preferred method of dispute settlement for sports. 
 
III The Meaning and Significance of Arbitration 
A No Agreed Definition of Arbitration 
 
When tasked with developing the provisions of the Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, the UNCITRAL Working Group decided that it was not 
desirable to have a comprehensive definition of arbitration.71 Instead “various attempts to 
define arbitration have sought to reflect the evolving general understanding and essential 
legal forms of arbitration”.72 For example, a judge in a recent Australian case, after a 
  
70  The most recent case being of Claudia Pechstein — a speed ice skater who allegedly used 
prohibited substances — who to date successfully annulled her CAS award in German national 
courts after failing to do so in the Swiss Federal Tribunal: see Oberlandesgericht (OLG) München, 
15 Januar 2015, Az U 1110/14 Kart (translated ed: Antoine Duval (translator) “Translation of the 
Pechstein Ruling of the OLG München” (6 February 2015) Social Science Research Network 
<www.ssrn.com>) [OLG München]. 
71  See Howard M Holtzmann and Joseph E Neuhaus A Guide to the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration: Legislative History and Commentary (TMC Asser 
Instituut, The Hague, 1989) as cited in ASADA v 34 Players and One Support Person [2014] VSC 
635 at [9], n 9. 
72  Julian D M Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll “Arbitration as a Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism” in Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer International Law, 
The Hague, 2003) 1 at [1-5]. 
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discussion of academic commentary on the meaning of arbitration, has listed the 
following features as those most commonly found in arbitration:73 
(a) It is a characteristic of arbitration that the parties should have a proper opportunity 
of presenting their case; 
(b) It is a fundamental requirement of an arbitration that the arbitrators do not receive 
unilateral communications from the parties and disclose all communications with 
one party to the other party; 
(c) The hallmarks of an arbitral process are the provision of proper and proportionate 
procedures for the provision and for the receipt of evidence; 
(d) The agreement pursuant to which the process is, or is to be, carried on (“the 
procedural agreement”) must contemplate that the tribunal which carries on the 
process will make a decision which is binding on the parties to the procedural 
agreement; 
(e) The procedural agreement must contemplate that the process will be carried on 
between those persons whose substantive rights are determined by the tribunal; 
(f) The jurisdiction of the tribunal to carry on the process and to decide the rights of 
the parties must derive either from the consent of the parties, or from an order of 
the court or from a statute, the terms of which make it clear that the process is to 
be an arbitration; 
(g) The tribunal must be chosen, either by the parties, or by a method to which they 
have consented; 
(h) The procedural agreement must contemplate that the tribunal will determine the 
rights of the parties in an impartial manner, with the tribunal owing an equal 
obligation of fairness towards both sides; 
(i) The agreement of the parties to refer their disputes to the decision of the tribunal 
must be intended to be enforceable in law; and 
(j) The procedural agreement must contemplate a process whereby the tribunal will 
make a decision upon a dispute which is already formulated at the time when the 
tribunal is appointed. 
 
  
73  ASADA v 34 Players and One Support Person, above n 71, at [21]–[46]. 
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International arbitration is comparable with the features listed above, but some evidential 
or procedural rules may vary between institutions that are in the business of providing 
arbitration services.74 Nevertheless, institutional arbitration, despite constraining the 
parties somewhat, typically retains the most common features found in arbitration: 
independence of the institution, impartiality towards disputants, party consent to 
arbitration, party autonomy, privacy and confidentiality, and enforcement of awards. 
These elements play a significant role in the later analysis of CAS’s arbitration, but in the 
meantime they might assist in developing an appreciation why arbitration is the preferred 
method of dispute resolution in sports. 
B Benefits of Arbitration When Resolving Sports Disputes 
 
As already noted, arbitration has evolved to become a popular dispute resolution method 
for sports because arbitral awards are binding, just like a State court’s decision, and 
arbitral panels are external to the sports-governing bodies.75 In an attempt to explain 
additional benefits of arbitration in contrast to other dispute settlement methods, it is best 
to use the Olympic Games motto Citius, Altius, Fortius, which is Latin for Faster, 
Higher, Stronger.76  
1 Citius/Faster 
 
It is crucial for sports disputes to be resolved in a speedy manner because many 
competitive events are held in a fixed period of time, leaving parties unable to wait 
months before a decision is reached.77 Hence, this is why disputing parties typically avoid 
litigation because court decisions may take months and even years to eventuate, 
especially if an appeal procedure is exhausted before a final verdict is made.  
 
  
74  See generally Gary B Born “Introduction to International Arbitration” in International Arbitration: 
Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2012) 3 at 29–34. 
75  See Part II.B: Sports Dispute Settlement at 11. 
76  International Olympic Committee “Olympism and the Olympic Movement” (2012) Olympic 
Movement <www.olympic.org> at 5. 
77  Reilly, above n 37, at 71–72; and see Thorpe and others, above n 11, at 17. 
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The best example of the need for speed is for those disputes that arise during the Olympic 
Games, which typically last for no more than 16 days.78 It is not surprising that CAS’s ad 
hoc division was originally set up to deal exclusively with Olympic Games disputes. It is 
also natural that other sports federations like UEFA and FIFA have signed up to CAS’s 
exclusive jurisdiction for its championships.79 
 
It is true, however, that not all sports disputes demand a resolution within a day: some 
disputes may, in principle, take several months (or longer) if need be. Nevertheless, it is 
important to appreciate that disputes involving athletes should not take a long period of 
time because, for most, professional sports is their job and main source of income. The 
longer the delay, the more unfair the whole process becomes on the athlete vis-à-vis the 
club or federation. Moreover, sportspeople retire at a much younger age compared to 
other employees, simply due to the nature of their profession, which demands physical 
fitness and wellbeing.80  
 
With regards to other disputes among businesses, event organisers, clubs, and 
associations, it is, on one hand, arguable that they could wait longer for their verdicts. 
However, on the other hand, the various contracts of sponsorship, player transfers, 
television or radio communications sales and other typical matters might need to be 
decided just as quickly, especially if they have connections to competitions that last 
between two to eight weeks. Overall, it is very desirable for all sports disputes to be 
resolved as soon as possible. 
2 Altius/Higher 
 
The meaning of the word higher in this section refers to the higher quality of decisions: 
arbitration is more equipped to provide a better answer to the questions posed by the 
  
78  International Olympic Committee, above n 14, at 6. 
79  See Part II.C: Overview of CAS at 14. 
80  Suzanne Cosh, Shona Crabb and Amanda LeCouteur “Elite athletes and retirement: Identity, 
choice and agency” (2013) 65(2) Australian Journal Of Psychology 88 at 88; and see generally Jay 
J Coakley “Leaving Competitive Sport: Retirement or Rebirth?” Academia <www.academia.edu>. 
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dispute. It is not surprising that the various arbitral tribunals choose to be specialised in 
the particular sport or in sports generally.81  
 
It is the experience and the expertise of an arbitral tribunal that proves very useful when 
accommodating for the various industries or fields in which disputes arise. This feature of 
expertise in arbitration is very important to sports, especially because there is a huge list 
of sports games and tournaments.82 It is very desirable that when bringing a claim to an 
arbitral tribunal, a sports disputant has confidence that educated in the particular field 
individuals hear the dispute. Furthermore, expertise of the arbitrators can reduce the time 
needed to resolve a dispute; providing another reason why arbitration is generally faster 
than litigation and, possibly, mediation.  
3 Fortius/Stronger 
 
Another major advantage of arbitration is its stronger enforcement. In a domestic sphere, 
an arbitral award can usually be enforced just like the national court’s decision.83 In an 
international sphere, arbitral awards are enforced more easily than foreign court 
judgments because of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (New York Convention),84 which has been accepted by 
156 countries.85 
 
Sports have become very globalised since 1980s.86 Consequently, there is a need for a 
dispute resolution forum that not only provides a decision, but also that such decision can 
be enforced internationally if it were to have any legitimacy: arbitration offers both an 
award and international enforcement. 
  
81  See Part II.B: Sports Dispute Settlement at 11. 
82  See Thorpe and others, above n 11, at 17. 
83  Lew, Mistelis and Kröll, above n 72, at [1-21]. 
84  New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 330 
UNTS 38 (signed 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959). 
85  United Nations “Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards” 
<www.treaties.un.org>. 
86  See Part II.B: Sports Dispute Settlement at 9. 
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4 Additional benefits 
 
There are certain other advantages of arbitrating sports disputes. One notable benefit is 
the reduced cost of arbitration compared to litigation:87 particularly present in CAS’s ad 
hoc division in which the proceedings are free of charge (the disputant must, however, 
pay for his own representation and use of experts, witnesses or interpreters).88  
 
Another benefit of an arbitral proceeding is its privacy and confidentiality, also extending 
to the award.89 This is in contrast to litigation in which the whole proceeding is public; 
arguably, however, mediation offers the same advantage. From the point of view of 
sports parties, privacy and confidentiality is important especially when dealing with 
sensitive topics. There is a contrary argument, however, that some disputants may prefer 
publicity in certain cases. Such debate is analysed in a later part.90 
 
In addition, arbitration is usually really flexible because it needs to be very particular to 
the needs of the parties to the dispute: even more so when parties come from different 
origins and systems, as is the practice in the world of sport.91  
 
Overall, this section tried to make it clear that arbitration is likely to be the most preferred 
method of dispute resolution for sports: it has strong advantages because of its speed, 
cost, privacy, expertise, enforceability, and because a binding arbitral award is likely to 
eventuate in most circumstances. 
 
IV Is CAS Really Arbitration? 
 
After discussing the many benefits of arbitration, it becomes obvious why CAS was 
initially created to resolve sports disputes using arbitration only. The natural question to 
  
87  Reilly, above n 37, at 72–74; and see Thorpe and others, above n 11, at 17. 
88  Ah Hoc Rules, above n 47, at art 22. 
89  Thorpe and others, above n 11, at 18. 
90  See Part IV.F.2: Are CAS’s confidentiality rules justified? at 56. 
91  See Lew, Mistelis and Kröll, above n 72, at [1-16]–[1-18]. 
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ask is whether or not CAS provides the prominent advantages of arbitration to sports 
disputants after its 30 years of operation. In order to answer that question, the main body 
of the paper discusses whether or not CAS is really arbitration using the following 
sections: party consent to arbitration, institutional independence, appointment of 
arbitrators, prohibition of role-switching, seat of arbitration — Switzerland, different 
treatment of awards between Ordinary and Appeals Divisions, ad hoc division and 
enforcement of awards. 
A Party Consent to Arbitration 
 
This section highlights how fundamental mutual consent is to arbitration, followed by a 
discussion of how consent is found in sports arbitration. It is then observed that the 
element of mutual consent is eroded in sports context, inciting some to believe that 
consent to sports arbitration is entirely fictional.  
1 Consent in arbitration 
 
Arbitration differs from litigation because consent of the parties to the dispute is the 
foundation stone of arbitration:92 “mutual consent … is indispensible to any process of 
dispute resolution outside national courts”.93 In other words, arbitration depends on the 
very existence of the agreement between parties; “[h]ence, this element of mutual consent 
  
92  David Williams and Daniel Kalderimis “Introduction” (paper presented to New Zealand Law 
Society Arbitration - contemporary issues and techniques seminar, September 2011) 1 at 2; see 
Paul D Friedland “Drafting An Effective Arbitration Agreement” in Arbitration Clauses For 
International Contracts (2nd ed, JurisNet, New York, 2007) 57 at 58–59; see Gary B Born 
“Introduction To International Arbitration Agreements” in International Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2009) 197 at 197–200; see generally Mauro Rubino-
Sammartano “The Sources Of International Arbitration Law” in International Arbitration Law and 
Practice (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2001) 47 at 56; and see generally Gary B 
Born “Legal Framework For International Arbitration Agreements” in International Commercial 
Arbitration (2nd ed, Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2014) 229 at 229–230.  
93  Andrea Marco Steingruber “Introduction” in Consent In International Arbitration (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2012) 1 at [1.05]. 
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is essential, as without it there can be no valid arbitration.”94 Various courts have 
repeatedly highlighted that a contract between parties is the “fundamental constituent of 
arbitration”.95 
 
Consent is defined as “[a]greement by choice, by one who has the freedom and capacity 
to make that choice. … Consent must be given freely, without duress or deception”.96 
One cannot but agree that freedom to make a choice is elementary to consent; thus, 
consent is one expression of another foundational principle of arbitration known as party 
autonomy: “parties have ultimate control of their dispute resolution system”.97 It is, 
therefore, sensible that consent of the parties establishes jurisdiction of an international 
arbitral tribunal and also determines its extent.98  
2 Consent in sports arbitration 
 
Consent to arbitrate a sports dispute is very commonly found in an arbitration clause of 
the sports-governing bodies’ regulations.99 As such, there has been a decline in the 
consensual character of arbitration in sports100 because an athlete is effectively forced “to 
accept the arbitration or to refrain from participating in the relevant sport”.101 
  
94  At [1.05] (footnotes omitted); and see Andrea Marco Steingruber “The Evolution Of Arbitration 
And Its Consensual Nature” in Consent In International Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) 11 at [2.10]. 
95  David A R Williams and Amokura Kawharu “Nature and Sources of Arbitration Law” in Williams 
& Kawharu on Arbitration (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2011) 3 at 1.3.1; see Forestry Corp of New 
Zealand Ltd (in rec) v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 328 (HC) at 332; and see also Williams 
and Kalderimis, above n 92, at 4–6. 
96  Jonathan Law (ed) A Dictionary of Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) at 
121; and see generally John P Grant and J Craig Barker (eds) Parry & Grant Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary of International Law (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) at 118. 
97  Lew, Mistelis and Kröll, above n 72, at [1-11] (emphasis in original). 
98  Steingruber, above n 94, at [2.01]. 
99  Antonio Rigozzi and Fabrice Robert-Tissot “‘Consent’ in Sports Arbitration: Its Multiple Aspects 
– Lessons from the Cañas decision, in particular with regard to provisional measures” in Elliott 
Geisinger and Elena Trabaldo - de Mestral (eds) Sports Arbitration: A Coach for Other Players? 
(JurisNet, New York, 2015) 59 at 59; but see CAS award annulled on the ground of lack of 
jurisdiction: BGE vom 6 November 2009 (4A_358) in (2011) 30 ASA Bull 166. 
100  Steingruber, above n 94, at [2.38]–[2.39]. 
101  Rigozzi and Robert-Tissot, above n 99, at 59. 
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Consequently, the substantive validity of the arbitration agreement may be questioned.102 
Certain regulations contain a clause similar to the following:103 
 
Any dispute arising from or related to the present contract will be submitted 
exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland, and 
resolved definitively in accordance with the Code of Sports-related Arbitration. 
 
In other words, the governing sports bodies — the IOC,104 World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA),105 FIFA,106, UEFA,107 and many more — have chosen CAS as the exclusive 
dispute resolution institution for their disputes.108  
 
There is also a suggestion that the mutual consent element is further eroded in sports, 
precisely because WADA designates CAS as the body hearing appeals from its decisions 
relating to doping.109 WADA Code has been accepted by more than 570 sport 
organisations110 and many governments have committed to it by signing the Copenhagen 
  
102  Steingruber, above n 94, at [2.40], [2.45] and [2.47]. 
103  Blackshaw, above n 43, at 2 (emphasis added); and see also Despina Mavromati and Matthieu 
Reeb “R27: Application of the Rules” in The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: 
Commentary, Cases and Materials (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2015) 19 at 58–
59. 
104  Olympic Charter, above n 13, at art 61. 
105  World Anti-Doping Agency “World Anti-Doping Code 2015” <www.wada-ama.org> at arts 4, 
8.5, and 13. 
106  Fédération Internationale de Football Association “FIFA Statutes” (August 2014) 
<www.fifa.com> at arts 66–68. 
107  UEFA “UEFA Statutes” (2014) <www.uefa.org> at arts 60–63. 
108  Mavromati and Reeb, above n 2, at 7; see Antonio Rigozzi and Erika Hasler “Article R47: 
Appeal” in Manuel Arroyo (ed) Arbitration in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer 
Law International, The Netherlands, 2013) 982 at [11]–[30]; see also Blaise Stucki and Elliott 
Geisinger “Chapter 10 – Swiss and Swiss-based Arbitral Institutions” in Gabrielle Kaufmann-
Kohler and Blaise Stucki (eds) International Arbitration in Switzerland: A Handbook for 
Practitioners (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2004) 181 at 198–202; and see also Reeb, 
above n 2, at 37. 
109  See Steingruber, above n 94, at [2.52]. 
110  At [2.52]. 
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Declaration of Anti-Doping in Sport in 2003,111 and later by committing to the UNESCO 
International Convention against Doping in Sport112 (accepted, approved, ratified or 
acceded by 182 States as of July 2015).113 Consequently, as provisions for CAS 
arbitration of WADA decisions make their way into national legislations, “arbitration 
before the CAS … [would become] de facto compulsorily provided for by the law”.114 In 
other words, mandatory arbitration of such types of sports disputes would imply there is 
no mutual consent to arbitrate. 
3 Criticism of consent in sports arbitration 
 
Jan Paulsson — a former CAS arbitrator — has described the consensual process of 
sports arbitrations as “an abuse of language”.115 The author likened an accused participant 
who faces sports proceedings to “a tourist [that] would experience a hurricane in Fiji: a 
frightening and isolated event in his [life], and for which he is utterly unprepared”.116 
This is contrasted to sports federations, which give jurisdiction to sporting authorities via 
by-laws and which grant licences to those wishing to compete in various events.117 Those 
federations have existed for very long periods of time and have, without a doubt, 
“developed a more or less complex and entirely inbred procedure for resolving 
[disputes]”.118 Hence, according to Jan Paulsson, the purported consent of sports 
authorities or their athletes is entirely fictional.119 
 
  
111  See World Anti-Doping Agency “Anti-Doping Community: Governments” <www.wada-
ama.org>.  
112  International Convention against Doping in Sport 2419 UNTS 201 (signed 19 October 2005, 
entered into force 1 February 2007). 
113  UNESCO “International Convention against Doping in Sport 2005: List in chronological order” 
<www.unesco.org>. 
114  Steingruber, above n 94, at [2.52] (emphasis in original). 
115  Jan Paulsson “Arbitration Of International Sport Disputes” in Ian S Blackshaw, Robert C R 
Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004 (TMC Asser 
Press, The Hague, 2006) 40 at 42. 
116  At 41. 
117  At 41. 
118  At 41. 
119  At 41. 
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The author acknowledges that his analogy to the tourist in Fiji is also applicable to most 
litigants in ordinary courts.120 However, practitioners in litigation that represent the 
accused have vast experience and, more importantly, appear before the court as equals.121 
In contrast, Jan Paulsson argues that the sports federations’ procedures for disputes are 
closely connected to the organisation itself such that “no outsider has the remotest chance 
of standing on an equal footing with his adversary – which is of course the federation 
itself”.122  
 
Other authors likewise highlight the inequality of bargaining power of sports-governing 
bodies. In particular, it is said that major sports bodies tend to have an absolute or near 
monopoly in sport governance.123 Such monopolistic position allows the sports bodies to 
withdraw any participant’s right to take part in sports.124 It becomes easy to see how “[t]o 
assert that sports arbitration is voluntary because one can avoid it by abstaining from 
taking part in the sport is to take intellectual purity to an absurd extreme.”125  
 
On the point of sports bodies being monopolistic, a German court recently decided that 
the International Skating Union “could not require … [the complainant] to agree to the 
arbitration clause” because of its dominant market position in world championships of 
speed skating.126 Hence, a monopolist was prevented from abusing its power over the 
athlete. 
4 In support of sports arbitration 
 
In contrast to the critiques above, the Swiss Federal Tribunal is adamant that there is a 
valid CAS arbitration agreement despite the lack of consent, because of “a certain logic 
  
120  At 42. 
121  At 42. 
122  At 42. 
123  See Michael Beloff and others “Remedies: The Resolution of Legal Disputes in Sport” in Sports 
Law (2nd ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 257 at [8.135]. 
124  At [8.135]. 
125  At [8.135]. 
126   OLG München, above n 70, at [80]–[82]. 
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… favouring the prompt settlement of disputes, particularly in sports-related matters, by 
specialised arbitral tribunals presenting sufficient guarantees of independence and 
impartiality”.127 The Swiss Federal Tribunal provided the following reasons for its 
view:128 
(1) Compulsory arbitration in sports is acceptable because of its inherent advantages 
for sports-related disputes; and 
(2) An action to set aside the award is always available to an athlete, 
counterbalancing the liberal approach of examining the validity of a sports 
arbitration agreement. 
 
Two commentators have generally shared the view of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, but 
have questioned its second reason given how narrow the grounds are in PILS on which 
the athlete can set aside a CAS award.129 The scholars do, nonetheless, agree that sports 
arbitration agreements are valid:130 
 
We think that the “real” reason the arbitration agreement should enjoy a preferential 
treatment as far as the requirement of consent is concerned relates to the nature of 
such agreement. Indeed (unlike the agreement to waive the action to set aside the 
award) the arbitration agreement does not constitute a waiver stricto sensu. While it 
certainly excludes the state court jurisdiction, it does so in exchange for the 
opportunity for the parties to have their dispute settled through arbitration. In other 
words, arbitral jurisdiction constitutes the quid pro quo for the waiver of the state 
court jurisdiction.  
 Of course to speak of quid pro quo, one must assume that arbitration is equivalent 
to litigation before state courts, in particular that it offers the same guarantees of 
independence and impartiality. … We consider that this approach is reasonable in 
sports arbitration as it can be validly argued that arbitration in sports matters is more 
  
127  ATF 133 III 235, at [4.3.2.3] (emphasis added) (translated ed: Paolo Michele Patocchi and 
Matthias Scherer (eds) The Swiss International Arbitration Law Reports: 2007–2009, Vols 1–3, 
Consolidated (JurisNet, New York, 2012) at 65–69). 
128  At [4.3.2.3]. 
129  Rigozzi and Robert-Tissot, above n 99, at 67; and see Part II.C: Overview of CAS at 14–15. 
130  Rigozzi and Robert-Tissot, above n 99, at 67–68 (emphasis in original). 
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efficient than court litigation. To the extent that the CAS provides the athletes with a 
better alternative, one can understand that it is sufficient that arbitration is provided 
for by the sports regulations, irrespective of whether the athletes had a chance to 
agree. In other words, as CAS constitutes a genuine (and arguably better) option than 
state courts in sports disputes, sports governing bodies are allowed to compel the 
athletes to arbitrate. From this perspective, the exclusion of the state court 
jurisdiction does not constitute (an invalid) waiver of a right, but rather a (valid) 
trade-off.  
 
Later it was emphasised that the athletes must have no doubts as to the independence and 
impartiality of CAS vis-à-vis the body that compelled the athlete to arbitrate, in order for 
the compulsory nature of arbitration to be legitimate.131 
5 Recommendation 
 
This section opened with the concept that if there is no mutual consent, there is no valid 
arbitration agreement. Hence, if a sports disputant does not consent to arbitration then 
resort to national courts for dispute resolution is the next logical step. However, it is not 
desirable for courts to interfere in the affairs of sports-governing bodies, as explained 
earlier;132 thus, the view of Swiss Federal Tribunal that arbitration is the most preferred 
method for resolving sports-related disputes because of its inherent benefits is 
acknowledged. But that reason alone cannot be prioritised over the fundamental 
requirement that gives arbitration its validity: mutual consent to arbitrate. Therefore, a 
compromise has to be made. As such, the recommendation of this paper wishes to draw 
upon advice given by another commentator:133 
 
In reality, the athlete often may not know that the arbitration clause exists, especially 
when the clause is buried within a lengthy list of by-laws.  
Perhaps this potential oversight would present fewer conflicts if the arbitration 
clause required a higher level of consent, relative to other portions of the license 
  
131  At 71. 
132  See Part II.B: Sports Dispute Settlement at 10–11. 
133  Stephen A Kaufman “Issues In International Sports Arbitration” (1995) 13 BU Intl LJ 527 at 544. 
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agreement. For example, the governing body could require the athlete to separately 
sign the arbitration clause or affix his initials next to it. Or the arbitration clause 
could be printed in red, extra large, bold print, to ensure the athlete does not 
overlook it.  
 
In summary, it is vital that consent, the one ingredient most important to arbitration, is 
preserved in sports arbitration, but that it should take a more attenuated form because of 
the need to keep the interference of litigation out. The stated recommendation would not 
demand a drastic change in the current practice of sports-governing bodies: they may still 
retain the arbitration clause in their regulations and they may still retain CAS as the 
exclusive dispute resolution institution; the only difference would be to inform the athlete 
of such arbitration clause, which can be perhaps indicated by the athlete’s initials or 
signature next to it.  
 
It is true that the recommendation is not a ‘silver bullet’ against the forceful nature of 
arbitration in sports, but it is still better than having no mutual consent at all if arbitration 
were to become mandatory (ie supported by national legislations as seen by their support 
of WADA Code arbitral provisions naming CAS as the exclusive body, already noted 
earlier).134 Informed consent is, indeed, consent, which would give validity to arbitration 
and, therefore, avoid the interference of courts in sports-related disputes. Moreover, CAS 
might not be questioned as an arbitral tribunal if a fully informed sports disputant agrees 
to a clause stipulating CAS’s exclusiveness in hearing sports disputes. 
B Institutional Independence 
 
It will be recalled that the Swiss Federal Tribunal’s decision suggested CAS is impartial 
and independent, and the two commentators who supported the decision have emphasised 
that impartiality and independence of CAS is important.135 This section is the first of 
three in this paper that collectively challenge CAS’s impartiality and independence. 
  
134  See Part IV.A.2: Consent in sports arbitration at 24–25. 
135  See Part IV.A.4: In support of sports arbitration at 26–27. 
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Specifically, this section questions CAS’s institutional framework, while the next two 
sections question its arbitrators.136  
1 Independence defined 
 
One rule, which is fundamental to upholding the rule of law, is that each and every 
decision maker remains impartial and independent.137 Independence requires that there be 
no actual or past dependent relationship between the parties that could affect the decision 
maker’s judgment in favour of either party, or no such relationship even if it appears to 
affect the decision maker.138  
 
In order to achieve the independence of arbitrators, it is crucial that the institution that 
appoints those arbitrators is also independent or at least does not appear to be dependent. 
This section discusses whether or not CAS arbitrators appear to be dependent because a 
body, which is administered and financed by the Olympic Committees, governs CAS. 
The natural conclusion of arbitrators’ lack of independence, even if it appears to be so, is 
that their awards against sports disputants could be prejudiced. 
2 CAS’s evolution in achieving independence 
 
Upon its inception, CAS was comprised of 60 members chosen by the Olympic 
Committees and the IOC President.139 The IOC paid for all of CAS’s operating costs,140 
and the CAS Statute could only be modified by the IOC Session on the proposal of the 
  
136  See Part IV.C: Appointment of Arbitrators at 41; and see Part IV.D: Prohibition of Role-
Switching at 46. 
137  See generally Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Cooperation with the 
International Bar Association “Chapter 4: Independence and Impartiality of Judges, Prosecutors 
and Lawyers” in Professional Training Series No 9: Human Rights in the Administration of 
Justice – A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers (United Nations, New 
York and Geneva, 2003) 113 at 113–158. 
138  Pedro Sousa Uva “A Comparative Reflection On Challenge Of Arbitral Awards Through The 
Lens Of The Arbitrator’s Duty Of Impartiality And Independence” 20 Am Rev Intl Arb 479 at 
485. 
139  Simma, above n 13, at 23. 
140  Reeb, above n 2, at 32–33. 
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IOC Executive Board.141 In brief, IOC had a very predominant role in the affairs of CAS. 
Despite wishing CAS to be an independent arbitral tribunal, criticism of its lack of 
independence soon emerged. 
 
In 1994 CAS’s lack of independence from the IOC was challenged in a landmark Swiss 
Federal Tribunal decision initiated by Elmar Gundel, a horse rider who was dissatisfied 
with his award from CAS.142 The Swiss Federal Tribunal did acknowledge CAS as a true 
court of arbitration; however, it did point to various links between CAS and the IOC that 
could seriously jeopardise CAS’s independence.143 Specifically, the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal pointed to the IOC’s almost exclusive funding of CAS, IOC’s power to modify 
CAS’s Statute and the vast power held by the IOC and its President in appointing CAS 
members.144 Overall, the Swiss Federal Tribunal thought that such connections between 
the IOC and CAS would raise sufficiently serious questions as to CAS’s independence, 
especially if the IOC were a party to an arbitral dispute.145 
 
As a direct consequence of the Gundel decision, CAS was restructured to ensure that 
organisationally and financially it became independent from the IOC. In 1994 an 
agreement known as the Paris Agreement was entered into by the “highest authorities 
representing the sports world” that was to become the foundation of CAS Code that is in 
force nowadays.146 Despite the desirable consequence of Gundel judgment causing 
CAS’s restructuring, it is argued that CAS and the IOC only seem to be independent. The 
details of the Paris Agreement are discussed next. 
  
141  At 33. 
142  ATF 119 II 271 (translated ed: Matthieu Reeb “Extract of the judgement of March 15, 1993, 
delivered by the 1st Civil Division of the Swiss Federal Tribunal in the case G versus Fédération 
Equestre Internationale and Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) (public law appeal)(translation)” 
in Digest of CAS Awards 1986–1998 (Stæmpfli Editions SA, Berne, 1998) 561). 
143  ATF 119 II 271, above n 142, at [3b]. 
144  At [3b]. 
145  At [3b]. 
146  Reeb, above n 2, at 33. 
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3 CAS and the IOC only seem to be independent 
 
The Paris Agreement of 1994147 created a new structure for CAS, but, more importantly, 
it led to a creation of an institution known as the International Council of Arbitration for 
Sport (ICAS), which was meant to take the place of the IOC in CAS’s affairs.148 ICAS is 
composed of 20 members appointed using the following procedure:149 
(1) 4 members are appointed by the IOC (chosen from within or outside its 
membership); 
(2) 3 members are appointed by the Summer Olympics Association and 1 member by 
the Winter Olympics Association (chosen from within or outside their 
membership); 
(3) 4 members are appointed by the ANOC (chosen from within or outside its 
membership); 
(4) 4 members are appointed by the 12 members listed above, after appropriate 
consultation with a few of safeguarding the interests of athletes; and 
(5) 4 members are appointed by the 16 members listed above, chosen from among 
personalities independent of the bodies designating the other members of ICAS. 
 
In addition, ICAS is funded by the IOC deductions from sums the following bodies are 
entitled to as part of IOC’s revenue from television rights for the Olympic Games: 3/12 
by Summer Olympics Association, 1/12 by Winter Olympics Association, 4/12 by ANOC 
and 4/12 by IOC.150 In essence, these Olympic Committees appoint members of ICAS 
and actually fund it as well. On its face, this might not seem like an inappropriate 
  
147  Matthieu Reeb “Agreement related to the constitution of the International Council of Arbitration 
for Sport (ICAS)” in Digest of CAS Awards III 2001–2003 (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2004) 767 at 767–769. 
148  Reeb, above n 2, at 34. 
149  CAS Code, above n 45, at S4. 
150  Reeb, above n 147, at 768. 
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arrangement, but a problem arises when one understands the relationship between ICAS 
and CAS.151  
 
ICAS was specifically set up to facilitate the resolution of sports disputes and to 
safeguard CAS’s independence and the rights of the parties.152 ICAS is also responsible 
for the administration and financing of CAS because in practice the CAS Court Office 
undertakes its administration and financial accounting.153 ICAS members are not 
involved in CAS proceedings directly because they are forbidden from being arbitrators 
or counsel for any party in the proceedings;154 but the President of CAS is also President 
of ICAS, who is naturally a member of ICAS Board, exercising ICAS’s functions in most 
circumstances.155To list some of ICAS’s functions vis-à-vis CAS, it:  
(a) adopts and amends the CAS Code;156  
(b) elects the Presidents (and deputies) of Ordinary and Appeals Divisions from 
among its own members;157  
(c) appoints and may terminate the Secretary General158 (who with other Counsel 
constitutes the CAS Court Office and who acts as ICAS’s Secretary having a 
consultative voice in the decision-making);159  
(d) appoints and removes CAS arbitrators to and from a list;160  
(e) resolves any challenges of arbitrators;161 and  
(f) supervises activities of the CAS Court Office.162 
 
  
151  See also Jason Gubi “The Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause and the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport: An Analysis of Due Process Concerns” (2008) 18 Fordham Intell Prop Media & Ent LJ 997 
at 1018. 
152  CAS Code, above n 45, at S2. 
153  At S2. 
154  At S5. 
155  At S7 and S9. 
156  At S6(1). 
157  At S6(2). 
158  At S6(6). 
159  At S10 and S22. 
160  At S6(3). 
161  At S6(4). 
162  At S6(7). 
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This paper argues that the 1994 reforms have made the connection between CAS and the 
IOC seem wider by placing in its place a body with a different name as an intermediary, 
but not actually so much wider because that same intermediary is funded and appointed 
by the IOC and other constituents of the Olympic Committees — associations that gain 
their own recognition from the IOC. Hence, the ICAS (intermediary) institution does not 
remove the substantive lack of CAS’s independence from the IOC as much as it would 
have been hoped for. Because ICAS is key to CAS’s independence from the IOC or other 
Olympic Committees, it is best to see whether Gundel judgment’s concerns have been 
dealt with properly.  
4 Swiss Federal Tribunal strongly believes in CAS’s independence  
 
Another landmark Swiss Federal Tribunal case, while referring to the Gundel judgment, 
confirmed CAS’s independence from the IOC in 2003.163 It will be recalled that the 
Gundel decision raised an issue with IOC’s exclusive financing of CAS.164 The Swiss 
Federal Tribunal in 2003 concluded that the financing of CAS, via ICAS, from 
contributions made by all Olympic Committees “is not likely to jeopardise the 
independence of [CAS]”.165 The Swiss Federal Tribunal added that “there is not 
necessarily any relationship of cause and effect between the way a judicial body is 
financed and its level of independence”;166 in order to prove its point, the following 
example was used:167 
 
State courts in countries governed by the rule of law are often required to rule on 
disputes involving the State itself, without their judges’ independence being 
questioned on the ground that they are financially linked to the State. Similarly, the 
CAS arbitrators should be presumed capable of treating the IOC on an equal footing 
  
163  ATF 129 III 445 (translated ed: “Switzerland: Tribunal Fédéral [Federal Supreme Court], 27 May 
2003” (2004) XXIX Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration 206). 
164  See Part IV.B.2: CAS’s evolution in achieving independence at 31. 
165  At [3.3.3.2]. 
166  At [3.3.3.2]. 
167  At [3.3.3.2]. 
35 VIKTORIYA PASHORINA-NICHOLS LAWS 521 
with any other party, regardless of the fact that it partly finances the Court of which 
they are members and which pays their fees. 
 
Arguably, the analogy of national court’s administration and financing to an international 
arbitral tribunal is inappropriate for the following reasons: 
(a) At its basic level, a State court is a court of law presided by the appointed 
judiciary, whereas CAS is an arbitral tribunal presided by (party-appointed) 
arbitrators. Each dispute settlement method has its own rules and procedures and, 
as mentioned above, arbitration differs in many respects from litigation.168 Hence, 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal was too swift in presuming that the same equal 
treatment is accorded to the parties in a dispute; 
(b) The IOC or other international sports federations are not comparable in their roles 
and functions with the State, and thereby are not comparable in their relationship 
with the judiciary. The State’s role is to govern its own citizens on a wide variety 
of issues and judiciary in fact makes up a leg in the tripod of State government.169 
The same cannot be said for CAS — it is not a judiciary branch in the same sense. 
Hence, sports federations are not equivalent to the legislative and executive 
branches of the State and CAS is not equivalent to the judiciary; and 
(c) The reason judicial independence is preserved in a domestic sphere is said to be 
because of the separation of powers doctrine and because of ‘checks and balances’ 
in place among the judicial, legislative and executive branches of a State.170 In 
contrast, there are no procedures for the Olympic Committees, ICAS or CAS to 
check on each other. In fact, the Olympic Committees effectively control ICAS 
through their funding and appointment of it and, in turn, ICAS holds 
responsibility over CAS: this chain suggests there is a vertical relationship as 
opposed to a horizontal one among the institutions. 
  
168  See Part III.B: Benefits of Arbitration When Resolving Sports Disputes at 18–21. 
169  Gerard McCoy “Judicial recusal in New Zealand” in H P Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative 
Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) 322 at 324. 
170  Shimon Shetreet “Judicial independence and accountability: core values in liberal democracies” in 
H P Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2011) 3 at 9. 
36 IS THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT REALLY ARBITRATION? 
 
In addition, it will be recalled that the Gundel judgment raised concerns over IOC’s 
power to alter CAS’s constituting document.171 Since 1994 CAS Code can no longer be 
changed solely by the IOC (which is a step in the right direction), but instead requires 
approval of 2/3 of ICAS members.172 In essence, the CAS Code can be amended as long 
as 13 ICAS members agree (ie 2/3 of 20). There is a problem here because the 13 
members could be individuals chosen by the Olympic Committees from within ‘the 
Olympic family’, meaning that the ICAS members that are truly independent from the 
Olympic Committees may be outvoted. Furthermore, the quorum for ICAS resolutions is 
10 members, which makes it even easier to affect change in CAS (ie 2/3 of 10 is just over 
6 members). There is a danger that those members may be sourced purely from within the 
Olympic world or only from the IOC. On this point, the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 2003 
actually stated:173 
 
Of course, the wording of Article S4 of the Code does not totally exclude the 
possibility of the former [IOC] having control over the latter [ICAS]: if each of the 
bodies mentioned under letters a (IFs) and b (ANOC) of the said Article were to 
appoint four IOC members to the ICAS, which they are perfectly at liberty to do 
(“chosen from within or from outside their/its membership”), and if the IOC 
appointed four of its members, twelve of the twenty ICAS seats would be held by 
IOC members, which could cause problems. 
 
It is, thus, not surprising how easy it is to change the CAS Code: in fact it has been 
amended in 1994, 2004, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013, and has been described as a 
“piecemeal and reactive” process as opposed to “being implemented as a systematic 
review”.174 Overall, it seems as if the Gundel decision’s concern has not been adequately 
dealt with. 
 
  
171  See Part IV.B.2: CAS’s evolution in achieving independence at 31. 
172  CAS Code, above n 45, at S8(2). 
173  ATF 129 III 445, above n 163, at [3.3.3.2] (emphasis in original). 
174  Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [23]. 
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Lastly, Gundel decision raised an issue with the IOC’s power to appoint CAS 
members.175 Even though the decision caused the creation of ICAS — an intermediary — 
ICAS is fully appointed by the IOC together with the other Olympic Committees 
members.176 Even more striking is the fact that the Olympic Committees also have an 
influence over the appointment of CAS arbitrators — a concern that deserves a section in 
itself, discussed shortly.177 For the meantime, it suffices to say that the IOC still retains 
enough influence along with the other members of the Olympic Committees to 
reasonably question the whole procedure and ICAS’s role as intermediary and, thus, the 
independence of CAS arbitrators. 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that ICAS is a barrier between the IOC and CAS, a 
fortunate outcome from the Gundel decision, but a barrier that is currently too small to 
prevent IOC’s influence over CAS effectively. As a result, this paper suggests that 
decisions rendered by CAS might be prejudiced in cases where one of the disputant 
parties is a member of the Olympic Committees (or is one of the sports-governing bodies 
that gain their recognition from them), because there appears to be a dependant 
relationship with CAS arbitrators. Moreover, an appearance of the lack of independence 
suffices because actual lack of independence is “virtually impossible to prove”, as stated 
by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 2003.178 
5 Recommendations 
 
In order to make the gap between the IOC and CAS wider, the role and function of ICAS 
becomes key. It is recommended that a comparison be made with the institutional 
structure of the Court of Arbitration (ICC Court) of International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), which could assist in making the relationship between CAS and the IOC not 
appear dependent. 
 
  
175 See Part IV.B.2: CAS’s evolution in achieving independence at 31. 
176  See Part IV.B.3: CAS and the IOC only seem to be independent at 32. 
177  See Part IV.C: Appointment of Arbitrators at 41. 
178  ATF 129 III 445, above n 163, at [3.3.3]. 
38 IS THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT REALLY ARBITRATION? 
Since its establishment in 1919, ICC has expanded to become:179 
 
 … one of the most important private international organizations in the world’s 
economy … [because] ICC promotes and achieves harmonization and legal progress 
in core issues in international trade and commerce. 
 
Hence, ICC is a nongovernmental institution: its “‘delegates are business executives and 
not government officials’”.180 This is similar to the Olympic Committees’ constituents, 
none of which are States. The ICC Court has administered over 20,000 arbitration cases 
since its inception in 1923.181  
 
The World Council — ICC’s supreme authority182 — appoints ICC Court members on 
the proposal of its National Committees or Groups:183 one member for each of the 
(approximately) 90 National Committees or Groups.184 Similarly, the Olympic 
Committees could appoint ICAS members on the proposal of their sports-governing 
bodies or individual members. Such arrangement would reduce the centralised role of the 
Olympic Committees’ boards and instead give the power to its members. 
 
Alternatively, other sports associations — for example ARISF, SportAccord and 
International Paralympic Committee — could have the power to appoint ICAS members 
alongside Olympic Committees, thereby emphasising the role of world sport generally as 
opposed to Olympic sports only.  
  
179  P Habegger “Part I – Introduction” in Manuel Arroyo (ed) Arbitration in Switzerland: The 
Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2013) 663 at [1]–[2] (footnotes 
omitted). 
180  International Chamber of Commerce Annual Report (1998) at 19 as cited in Dominic Kelly “The 
International Chamber of Commerce” (2005) 10(2) New Political Economy 259 at 265, n 24. 
181  International Court of Arbitration “Dispute Resolution Services” (2014) International Chamber of 
Commerce <www.iccwbo.org> at 3.  
182  Kelly, above n 180, at 264. 
183  International Court of Arbitration “Arbitration Rules Mediation Rules” (2013) International 
Chamber of Commerce <www.iccwbo.org> at Appendix I art 3(3) [ICC Court Arbitration Rules]. 
184  See generally International Chamber of Commerce “Membership: National Committees and 
Groups” <www.iccwbo.org>. 
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Furthermore, whichever recommendation is accepted, the members given the power to 
appoint ICAS members could contribute to the funding of CAS, thereby reducing the 
share of the Olympic Committees’ financing of CAS via ICAS. 
 
In order to change the rules of ICC arbitration,185 the ICC Court must lay any proposal for 
scrutiny before ICC’s Commission on Arbitration and ADR (composed of over 700 
members)186 before being submitted to the Executive Board of ICC for approval.187 
Clearly, the two extra obstacles would prevent the rules from being amended swiftly by 
the ICC Court. Similarly, to avoid easy CAS Code amendments by ICAS members a 
procedure could be introduced that would scrutinise the amendments carefully before 
being approved. Hopefully such process would ensure that CAS Code amendments 
follow a systemic review, as opposed to being reactionary in nature.  
 
Lastly, a very unique feature of ICC Court “that distinguishes it from all other 
international arbitration rules”188 is its review of an arbitral award’s draft:189 
 
The Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the award and, without 
affecting the arbitral tribunal’s liberty of decision, may also draw its attention to 
points of substance.  
 
The review procedure normally takes two to three weeks, but could vary depending on 
the complexities involved.190 If a draft award does not raise serious problems, it is 
  
185  ICC Court Arbitration Rules, above n 183, at Appendix I art 7. 
186  See generally International Chamber of Commerce “About ICC: Policy Commissions - Arbitration 
and ADR” <www.iccwbo.org>. 
187  With the exception that the ICC Court does not need to lay a proposal with the Commission if, 
taking into account IT development, it wishes to modify or supplement provisions dealing with 
written notifications or communications. 
188  Lenggenhager “Article 33: Scrutiny of the Award by the Court” in Manuel Arroyo (ed) 
Arbitration in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 
2013) 854 at [2]. 
189  ICC Court Arbitration Rules, above n 183, at art 33. 
190  Lenggenhager, above n 188, at [12]. 
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scrutinised and approved by a committee of ICC Court.191 If ICC Court’s Secretariat 
finds a more problematic draft that “call[s] for a more detailed examination … [it is] 
submitted to a plenary session of the Court, for which one of its members (the 
rapporteur) prepares a report”.192 The Court’s plenary session then discusses the draft 
based on the report and decides whether the draft deserves approval.193 Clearly, multiple 
individuals are involved in the making of final award — a procedure that has increased 
the confidence of disputants and users in the ICC arbitral process.194 
 
Interestingly, the CAS Code has a very similar provision:195 
 
Before the award is signed, it shall be transmitted to the CAS Secretary General who 
may make rectifications of pure form and may also draw the attention of the Panel to 
fundamental issues of principle. 
 
The obvious objection to such approach is that the Secretary General of CAS might not 
be capable in carrying out the task alone. It is thus recommended that ICAS — holding 
responsibility over CAS — should be more involved in scrutiny of each draft; following 
ICC Court’s example from which the CAS Code must have drawn inspiration for its 
provision. Ultimately, the confidence in CAS’s decisions might be enhanced despite any 
appearances of dependency. 
 
This section attempted to highlight CAS’s journey in becoming an independent body 
from the IOC, but the key intermediary — ICAS — is not as strong as it could be in 
repelling the Olympic Committee’s influence over CAS. In an attempt to ensure CAS 
does not appear dependant in certain cases and, hence, also to give its decisions 
legitimacy, it is recommended that certain comparable features of the ICC Court be 
  
191  At [11]. 
192  At [11] (emphasis in original). 
193  At [11]. 
194  Habegger, above n 179, at [7]. 
195  CAS Code, above n 45, at R46 and R59. 
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implemented. One major concern for CAS arbitrators’ independence that is still left to 
discuss, and which deserves a section of its own, is the appointment of arbitrators. 
C Appointment of Arbitrators 
 
ICAS has the duty of appointing and removing CAS arbitrators.196 To fulfill that duty, 
ICAS establishes a list of arbitrators from which the parties must choose their arbitrator 
or have an arbitrator from the list appointed if the parties fail to agree: a closed list.197 
When coming to its decision to place an arbitrator on the list:198 
 
ICAS shall call upon personalities with appropriate legal training, recognised 
competence with regard to sports law and/or international arbitration, a good 
knowledge of sport in general and a good command of at least one CAS working 
language, whose names and qualifications are brought to the attention of ICAS, 
including by the IOC, the IFs and the NOCs.  
 
It is insisted that: 
(1) the involvement of the Olympic Committees in the process of appointing CAS 
arbitrators is another reason why arbitrators appear to be lacking independence, 
especially in cases where the Olympic Committees, or sports bodies constituting 
them, are involved in an arbitral proceeding; and  
(2) CAS’s closed list undermines party autonomy as well as having the potential to 
place arbitrators’ impartiality and independence into jeopardy. 
1 Criticism of the Olympic Committees’ involvement in appointing CAS arbitrators 
 
The rule quoted above — namely that arbitrators are appointed after their names and 
qualifications are brought to the attention of ICAS, including by the Olympic Committees 
— is relevantly recent. It was reformed in 2012 because there was criticism of the 
previous rule, which required the Olympic Committees to propose a list of arbitrators to 
  
196  At S6(3). 
197  At S3, R40.2, R53 and R54. 
198  At S14. 
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ICAS and ICAS then chose arbitrators from among those in a proportional distribution 
(eg 1/5th of arbitrators selected from among the persons proposed by the IOC).199 The 
previous rule even attracted criticism from a German national court: “the selection of the 
potential CAS arbitrators favour[ed] the sports associations in disputes against athletes, 
thus embedding a structural imbalance”,200 thereby placing the neutrality of CAS under 
threat.201  
 
This paper suggests that the new rule is certainly a step in the right direction because it 
granted ICAS some freedom to appoint those arbitrators who may never have been 
proposed to it previously by the Olympic Committees. However, the new rule may not 
have significantly changed ICAS’s practice because there is the danger that ICAS 
chooses arbitrators that were predominantly brought to its attention by, for instance, the 
IOC. It is most unfortunate that ICAS does not publish which arbitrators were proposed 
or recommended to it by what organisation. Hence, the independence of CAS arbitrators 
could still be questioned. 
 
Moreover, the new rule did not change the fact that all CAS arbitrators must appear in a 
list. 
2 Criticism of the closed list  
 
First, the closed list scheme takes away from the right of the parties to nominate their 
own arbitrator. This strikes at the heart of party autonomy, another principal 
characteristic of arbitration, which stands for the idea that “parties have ultimate control 
of their dispute resolution system”.202 In practice, this means that parties determine the 
form and structure of their arbitration, the seat of their dispute, the issues of their dispute 
and many other details.203 More importantly, the parties have the right to nominate their 
  
199  Antonio Rigozzi, Erika Hasler and Brianna Quinn “The 2011, 2012 and 2013 revisions to the 
Code of Sports-related Arbitration” (3 June 2013) Jusletter <www.jusletter.weblaw.ch> at 4, n 24. 
200  OLG München, above n 70, at [104]. 
201  At [104]. 
202  Lew, Mistelis and Kröll, above n 72, at [1-11] (emphasis in original). 
203  At [1-11]. 
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arbitrators.204 Clearly, the closed list system significantly limits the rights of the parties to 
nominate their arbitrators. 
 
Secondly, CAS’s closed list increases the risk of prejudice to arbitrators’ independence 
and impartiality: independence was defined and discussed earlier;205 impartiality refers to 
a duty of the decision maker not to favour any party or to be predisposed in a particular 
manner on the issue or subject of the dispute.206 The closed list affects both by:207 
(a) having the risk of repeat appointments (potentially leading to bias);  
(b) increasing the risk of conflict of interest among arbitrators, counsel and other 
parties in the ‘sports field’ that is already quite small and exclusive;208 and  
(c) making it hard to notice and prove any actual or apparent bias because CAS does 
not make any notification of dissenting judgments, thus, it is unclear whether a 
particular arbitrator constantly decides in one party’s favour.209  
 
Thirdly, by having a closed list over which ICAS retains all the power, there is a barrier 
of entry for other arbitrators who may be qualified to hear disputes (and perhaps even 
better qualified than those already on the list).210  
 
In summary, “there is … no objective reason not to allow a party to appoint an arbitrator 
who is not listed on the CAS list of arbitrators”;211 conversely, the closed list objectively 
raises questions over party autonomy and arbitrators’ impartiality and independence. 
  
204  See Gary B Born “Selection and Removal of Arbitrators in International Arbitration” in 
International Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2012) 
121 at 121. 
205  See Part IV.B.1: Independence defined at 30. 
206  Uva, above n 138, at 485. 
207  See Philippe Cavalieros “Can the arbitral community learn from the CAS closed list system?” 
(2014) Arbitration Ireland <www.arbitrationconference.com> at 5. 
208  See Philippe Cavalieros and Janet (Hyun Jeong) Kim “Can the Arbitral Community Learn from 
Sports Arbitration?” (2015) 32(2) J Intl Arb 237 at 245. 
209  CAS Code, above n 45, at R59. 
210  Cavalieros, above n 207, at 5. 
211  Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Philippe Bärtsch “The Ordinary Arbitration Procedure Of The 
Court Of Arbitration For Sport” in Ian S Blackshaw, Robert C R Siekmann and Janwillem Soek 
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3 Comparison with other arbitral institutions 
 
No other arbitral institution has a closed list equivalent to the CAS closed list; in fact, 
certain arbitral institutions actually moved away from having a closed list.212  
 
ICC Court had 1,331 arbitrators involved in disputes in 2010.213 WIPO Arbitration & 
Mediation Centre, which predominantly resolves intellectual property disputes, has over 
1,500 available arbitrators for disputes (called neutrals).214 The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes are 
tribunals that do have a list naming the arbitrators chosen by member States, because 
those two institutions are intergovernmental organisations; but, the disputing parties are 
free to choose their arbitrators, regardless of whether they appear on the list.215  
4 Recommendations  
 
Removing previous appointment of arbitrators based on a distribution scheme to a 
recommendation only rule was certainly a move in the right direction. However, it would 
be interesting to see whether ICAS’s practice in appointing CAS arbitrators has changed 
— an observation impossible to make because there was never any public information on 
which bodies proposed what arbitrators and there is no such current practice either. To 
make a more informative choice when choosing an arbitrator, a disputant might wish to 
see on whose recommendation did ICAS choose the particular arbitrator. In fact, the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal is of the same view: it advised that there be an indication of 
                                                                                                                                                 
(eds) The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004 (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2006) 69 at 
75, n 32. 
212  Ank Santens and Heather Clark “The Move Away from Closed-List Arbitrator Appointments: 
Happy Ending or a Trend to Be Reversed?” (28 June 2011) Kluwer Arbitration Blog 
<www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com>; and Cavalieros, above n 207, at 6. 
213  International Chamber of Commerce “Products and Services: Arbitration and ADR - Ten good 
reasons to choose ICC arbitration” <www.iccwbo.org>. 
214  World Intellectual Property Organization “IP Services: Alternative Dispute Resolution - Neutrals” 
<www.wipo.int>. 
215  Permanent Court of Arbitration “PCA Services: Arbitration Services” <www.pca-cpa.org>; and 
International Centre For Settlement Of Investment Disputes “Process: Selection and Appointment 
of Tribunal Members - ICSID Convention Arbitration” <www.icsid.worldbank.org>. 
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which institutions were responsible for proposing CAS arbitrators, so that “[t]he parties 
would then be able to appoint their arbitrator with full knowledge of the facts”.216Adding 
extra information on their current list of arbitrators would, arguably, not be too drastic of 
a change for ICAS to implement.  
 
Another possibility is to develop the rule further by stating that ICAS is an autonomous 
body fully fit and capable of choosing CAS arbitrators. Hence, there would no longer be 
the need to consider lists of proposed arbitrators from others (such as the Olympic 
Committees); ICAS could simply seek the arbitrators by itself. Thus, by enhancing the 
powers of the intermediary, there would be a corresponding reduction in the influence the 
Olympic Committees have over CAS. It must be repeated that the Gundel judgment 
raised concern over IOC’s appointment of CAS members in 1994. Thus, because the 
Olympic Committees currently have the exclusive right to appoint ICAS members, they 
should grant ICAS the exclusive power to appoint CAS arbitrators without their 
interference. 
 
A much more drastic change would be to remove the closed list altogether and, thus, 
enhance the caliber of arbitrators available to hear sports disputes. Even if an arbitrator 
does not have as much knowledge or experience in sports, there is always the possibility 
of hearing expert opinion if it is necessary.217 The concern over expertise might not be as 
great as it initially seems because it is highly likely that sports disputants, when 
appointing their arbitrators, would still choose a person with sports experience or at least 
a person with the relevant experience for their dispute.  
 
Moreover, the old rule of having a minimum of 150 arbitrators is clearly redundant 
because in practice CAS maintains a list of over 300 arbitrators.218 By removing the 
closed list, CAS will be in line with many other international arbitral institutions that had 
  
216  ATF 129 III 445, above n 163, at [3.3.3.2]. 
217  CAS Code, above n 45, at R44, R51 and R57. 
218  At S13; TAS/CAS “Arbitration: List of arbitrators (general list)” <www.tas-cas.org>; and see also 
Mavromati and Reeb, above n 2, at 6. 
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never had a closed list or were wise to remove it and, hence, have over 500 arbitrators at 
their avail.  
 
Furthermore, as is explained in detail next, removing the closed list could help in 
preventing the mischief that a new CAS Code rule recently prohibited: role-switching. 
D Prohibition of Role-Switching  
 
Previously counsel representing a party in one case could act as its CAS arbitrator in 
another dispute because there was nothing to prohibit such switching of the roles. Most, if 
not all, international commercial arbitration and investment treaty arbitration institutions 
do not have a clear-cut prohibition of role reversal of its arbitrators and counsel. In fact, it 
is a very hot debate in the literature whether role-switching should be allowed or 
prohibited.219  
 
A CAS Code reform, which took place only in late 2009,220 made it clear that “CAS 
arbitrators and mediators may not act as counsel for a party before the CAS.”221 The 
change took place not as a result of any Swiss Federal Tribunal decision, but as a result of 
criticism about the arbitrator and counsel “double-hat” roles, which inevitably increased 
the risk of conflicts and, accordingly, the number of petitions challenging the 
arbitrators.222 
 
Arguably, CAS was correct in taking a revolutionary step in adopting the new rule to 
prohibit such conduct because of CAS’s use of a closed list of arbitrators, which makes it 
so much more probable that impartiality of arbitrators is compromised in an ‘exclusive’ 
world of sport. As already mentioned above,223 impartiality refers to a duty of the 
  
219  See generally Günther J Horvath and Roberta Berzero “Arbitrator and Counsel: The Double-Hat 
Dilemma” (2013) 10(4) Transnational Dispute Management 1. 
220  Antonio Rigozzi “The recent revision of the Code of sports-related arbitration (CAS Code)” (13 
September 2010) Jusletter <www.jusletter.weblaw.ch> at 2–3. 
221  CAS Code, above n 45, at S18. 
222  Rigozzi, above n 220, at 2–3. 
223  See Part IV.C.2: Criticism of the closed list at 42–43. 
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decision maker not to favour any party or to be predisposed in a particular manner on the 
issue or subject of the dispute.224 It is described as “a state of mind, an inherent 
[behaviour] of the arbitrator that must lie in his spirit during the arbitration proceedings 
so as not to prejudice any of the parties”.225 It is inevitable that the arbitrators appearing 
on the list, who are meant to be the most (or at least more) experienced people in sports-
related disputes, would be preferred and chosen by the parties to act as their 
representatives in other cases. The risk of impartiality being prejudiced in such 
circumstances is certainly increased. 
1 Criticism of the new rule 
 
On its face it seems as if ICAS should be applauded for responding to criticism of CAS’s 
arbitrator-counsel role-switching. However, the new rule prohibiting such conduct is not 
without its own criticisms.226 
 
First, the new rule does not prohibit others in the same law firm as the arbitrator to act as 
counsel in CAS.227 This is in stark contrast to CAS’s own recommendatory circular, 
which existed before the reforms, that stipulated that the president of a panel in an 
appeals procedure must “be appointed only from among the CAS members who do not or 
whose law firm does not represent a party before the CAS at the time of such 
appointment”.228 Thus, the new rule has limited application because most of the 
advantages for lawyers in the same law firm as the CAS member can still be considered 
as available to them.229  
 
  
224  Uva, above n 138, at 485. 
225  At 485. 
226  See Joseph R Brubaker and Michael W Kulikowski “A Sporting Chance? The Court of Arbitration 
for Sport Regulates Arbitrator-Counsel Role Switching” (2010) 10(1) Va Sports & Ent LJ 1. 
227  Rigozzi, above n 220, at 3. 
228  At 3. 
229  At 3–4. 
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Secondly, there is an enforcement problem with the new rule: ICAS only has the power to 
remove the arbitrator temporarily or permanently.230 This would lead to the inevitable 
result that the arbitrator may switch to being counsel of a client and thereby breach the 
rule if it is economically more rational to do so (eg higher payment offered by the client 
than the arbitrator salary, which is a variable hourly rate between CHF 250 and 400).231  
 
Thirdly, a party to a dispute might find it extremely difficult to challenge arbitrator’s 
impartiality and independence on the ground of role-switching. After discussing various 
Swiss Federal Tribunal decisions on the subject, one commentator concluded that they 
have led to “the establishment of a very high standard of proof that the appellant must 
discharge, in order to impugn the independence of a CAS arbitrator”.232 Moreover, 
according to the Swiss Federal Tribunal,233 it is not a ground for challenging the award if 
an arbitrator in a CAS arbitration sat at the same time alongside counsel in another CAS 
arbitration representing one of the parties to the first arbitration.234 
2 Recommendation  
 
CAS took a welcoming active step by prohibiting the double hat roles of arbitrators and 
counsel, but the new rule is weak because it does not have any adequate enforcement 
mechanism in place against arbitrators and none against the counsel. It is time for CAS to 
take the next step by implementing a proper enforcement system in place in the form, for 
instance, of large penalties or even bans from representing disputants at CAS. 
E Seat of Arbitration — Switzerland 
 
The independence and impartiality of CAS have thus far been discussed within a paper, 
which questions whether or not CAS is really arbitration offering the benefits that sports 
  
230  CAS Code, above n 45, at S19. 
231  Rigozzi, above n 220, at 4, n 15. 
232  Rachelle Downie “Improving The Performance Of Sport’s Ultimate Umpire: Reforming The 
Governance Of The Court Of Arbitration For Sport” (2011) 12 Melb J Int Law 1 at 12. 
233  BGE vom 4 August 2006 (4P_105/2006) in (2007) 25(1) ASA Bull 105. 
234  Rigozzi, above n 220, at 3. 
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disputants should be reasonably entitled to. The following two sections focus on certain 
aspects of CAS rules that undermine party autonomy, and party privacy and 
confidentiality. This section specifically, after discussing the significance of the seat of 
arbitration generally, critiques Switzerland as the seat of arbitration for all CAS disputes.  
1 Significance of the seat  
 
Despite a strong presumption that arbitral awards are final and binding, there are limited 
circumstances in which parties to the dispute can challenge the award. This paper does 
not argue that it is wrong to challenge arbitral awards altogether, instead this paper argues 
that it is wrong that CAS’s awards can only be challenged by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. 
 
CAS Code stipulates that:235 
 
The award … shall be final and binding upon the parties. It may not be challenged 
by way of an action for setting aside to the extent that the parties have no domicile, 
habitual residence, or business establishment in Switzerland and that they have 
expressly excluded all setting aside proceedings in the arbitration agreement or in a 
subsequent agreement, in particular at the outset of the arbitration. 
 
The reason that CAS’s awards can only be challenged using Swiss arbitration law is 
because CAS Code states that the seat for arbitration is Lausanne, Switzerland.236The seat 
of arbitration is a legal construct as opposed to a geographic location: “the nation where 
an international arbitration has its legal domicile or juridical home”.237 Its most common 
feature is that the procedural law of the arbitration (lex arbitri) is typically the arbitration 
legislation of the arbitral seat; therefore, Swiss arbitration law is the procedural law 
governing CAS’s awards.238  
 
  
235  CAS Code, above n 45, at R46 and R59. 
236  At S1. 
237  See Gary B Born “International Arbitral Proceedings: Legal Framework” in International 
Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2012) 105 at 105. 
238 At 105. 
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The CAS Code’s stipulation of the seat similarly applies to the administration of disputes 
in CAS’s Sydney and New York branches because it was so confirmed by a New South 
Wales Court of Appeal (NSWCA) decision, in which the parties to the dispute were 
Australian, the arbitral panel was Australian and the proceedings were held in Sydney.239 
Moreover, all CAS Olympic ad hoc arbitrations have Swiss law as their lex arbitri.240The 
main advantage of having Swiss Federal Tribunal as the only court reviewing CAS’s 
awards is to ensure procedural consistency and legal certainty between all CAS cases.241 
2 Criticism of the seat 
 
The first objection against the seat being always Switzerland is its limitation on the party 
autonomy principle (defined earlier).242 As the NSWCA case showed, there is a strange 
conclusion that only the Swiss Federal Tribunal could hear a challenge to CAS’s award 
when the disputants were non-Swiss, holding a hearing of their dispute outside 
Switzerland, with a non-Swiss arbitral panel. Moreover, many other major international 
arbitral institutions let the parties have the freedom to choose what procedural law 
governs their arbitration, thereby giving effect to the party autonomy principle.243 
 
There is another objection to the seat because Switzerland has two different sets of 
arbitration rules: Swiss Civil Procedure Code (CPC) for nationals244 and PILS for 
internationals (noted earlier).245 This suggests that if the parties to the dispute are Swiss, 
they may invoke the use of the CPC (in fact, until 2008 CPC procedure was mandatory 
  
239  Raguz v Sullivan [2000] NSWCA 240. 
240  See Tobias Glienke “The finality of CAS awards” (2012) 3-4 The International Sports Law 
Journal 48. 
241  Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [18]; and Despina Mavromati and Matthieu Reeb “R28: 
Seat” in The Code of the Court of Arbitration for Sport: Commentary, Cases and Materials 
(Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2015) 63 at 74. 
242  See Part IV.C.2: Criticism of the closed list at 42. 
243  Mavromati and Reeb, above n 241, at 65–66; and see generally Born, above n 237, at 114–117. 
244  See generally Manuel Arroyo “Part I – History of Arbitration” in Manuel Arroyo (ed) Arbitration 
in Switzerland: The Practitioner’s Guide (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2013) 1 at 
[1]–[40]. 
245  See Part II.C: Overview of CAS at 14–15. 
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for nationals).246 The party’s advantages of invoking CPC are twofold: two instances of 
appeal (the Cantonal Court and the Swiss Federal Tribunal) and broader grounds for 
challenging arbitral awards.247 In other words, vis-à-vis other disputants in sports, Swiss 
parties have a privilege in choosing their CPC over PILS simply because of their 
nationality.  
 
Another problem evident with the seat is that the grounds for reviewing CAS awards 
under the PILS are not as extensive as they are found elsewhere; in particular, the merits 
of the case cannot be reviewed whether they are questions of fact or law (unless there is 
an allegation of violation of Swiss public policy).248 In other words, most of the grounds 
to challenge an award are procedural in their nature. This fact has led to only 6.5 per cent 
of arbitral awards’ reviews being allowed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal.249 In a sports 
context, the cumulative effect of the limited grounds for challenges coupled with a very 
conservative approach of the Swiss Federal Tribunal have led to only 10 CAS challenges 
allowed out of 126 since CAS’s inception.250 
 
It is true that consistency in law is a desirable principle and is, thus, the main advantage 
of having Switzerland as CAS’s arbitral seat. But substantively, CAS Code states that the 
disputing parties are free to choose the law that will govern their dispute in the Ordinary 
Division.251 In an Appeals Division dispute, the applicable regulations are prioritised as 
stipulating the law applicable to the merits of the dispute, followed by the parties’ 
agreement.252 Only failing any agreement does the law of the country apply in which the 
governing-sports body (whose decision is challenged) is domiciled.253 Otherwise, the 
  
246  Glienke, above n 240. 
247  Glienke, above n 240. 
248  Glienke, above n 240. 
249  Glienke, above n 240. 
250  Despina Mavromati “Jurisprudence Of The Swiss Federal Tribunal In Appeals Against CAS 
Awards” (15 September 2014) Social Science Research Network <www.ssrn.com> at [6]. 
251  CAS Code, above n 45, at R45. 
252  At R59. 
253  At R59. 
52 IS THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT REALLY ARBITRATION? 
arbitral panel decides what rules of law are appropriate, giving reasons for its decision.254 
Hence, Swiss law applies to the substance of the dispute only failing an agreement 
between the parties in an Ordinary Division and there is no mention of Swiss law 
applying at all in an Appeals Division.255 
 
If liberty is given to sports disputants to choose the law applying to their dispute’s merits, 
it follows that substantively the law might develop inconsistently because different rules 
and laws may apply with different outcomes deciding similar types of disputes. This is 
not a bad thing after all, however, because it actually gives effect to the principle of party 
autonomy — parties choose their dispute resolution — a principle undermined by having 
the seat of arbitration automatically set. 
3 Recommendations 
 
At the outset it must be acknowledged that it is well known that Switzerland is an 
arbitration-friendly nation, with many disputing parties willingly choosing Switzerland as 
their arbitral seat.256 However, it is argued that Switzerland being CAS’s automatic seat is 
a step too far. In order to give effect to the party autonomy principle — a principle 
fundamental to arbitration — parties should have some say in their seat.  
 
Perhaps the CAS Code could be amended to state that the seat is presumed to be 
Lausanne, Switzerland unless contrary intention is shown, thereby showing some 
consistency with its rules allowing parties to choose the law governing the merits of the 
dispute. Such change would accommodate for the many disputes, especially those held by 
CAS’s New York and Sydney branches that have no connection to Switzerland other than 
the fact that CAS is headquartered in Switzerland. 
 
For a slightly alternative approach, a useful comparison may be drawn with WIPO 
Arbitration & Mediation Centre: the Centre decides on the place of arbitration after 
  
254  At R59. 
255  At R45 and R59. 
256  Born, above n 237, at 119–120. 
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taking into account parties’ observations and circumstances of arbitration and the award 
is deemed to be made at the place of arbitration.257 In other words, the seat of arbitration 
will have been chosen after considering the disputing parties’ wishes. Similarly, CAS, if 
not giving total freedom to the disputants to choose their own seat, could state that CAS 
retains the power to appoint the seat after taking into consideration the circumstances of 
the arbitration. 
 
If no significant change is made to the seat of CAS arbitration, then, at least, the CAS 
Code should be amended to state that Swiss disputants, once they have submitted their 
dispute, waive their rights to the applicability of CPC. In other words, to be consistent 
among all sports disputants the PILS should only be used when an appeal is lodged with 
the Swiss Federal Tribunal. In fact, the newly enacted CPC allows the disputing parties to 
opt-out of its applicability in favour of PILS:258 
 
… to avoid the inevitable unequal treatment due to the application of two different 
legal regimes governing arbitration in cases that are virtually identical but for the 
domiciles or places of habitual residence of the parties involved. 
 
However, neither CAS nor any of the sports-governing bodies have yet varied their 
regulations to such effect.259 
F Different Treatment of Awards Between Ordinary and Appeals Divisions 
 
This section raises concern over CAS’s erosion of the party’s right to confidentiality in its 
Appeals Division, especially because, unlike litigation, one of the main attractions of 
arbitration to the parties in dispute is its promise of privacy and confidentiality: empirical 
  
257  World Intellectual Property Organization “IP Services: Alternative Dispute Resolution - WIPO 
Arbitration Rules” <www.wipo.int> at art 38; and World Intellectual Property Organization “IP 
Services: Alternative Dispute Resolution - WIPO Expedited Arbitration Rules” <www.wipo.int> 
at art 33. 
258  Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [19] (footnotes omitted). 
259  At [19]. 
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research found that confidentiality was third in a list of 11 reasons for arbitration.260 As 
Jessel MR in the United Kingdom explained “[c]ommercial arbitrations are essentially 
private proceedings and unlike litigation in public courts do not place anything in the 
public domain.”261 
 
Confidentiality relates to the fact that any information concerning the particular arbitral 
dispute resolution is not to be disclosed to third parties.262 In particular, confidentiality 
imposes the duty not only to prevent third parties from the arbitral hearings, but also the 
duty not to disclose the hearing transcripts, written pleadings, submissions, arbitration 
adduced evidence, other materials that have a connection to the arbitration in question 
and, of course, the arbitral award.263 
 
Many arbitral institutions have clear text in their own rules, highlighting how crucial it is 
not just for the parties and the arbitral panels to observe privacy and duty of 
confidentiality rules, but also for the members of courts, centres and their secretariats.264 
Moreover, the right to confidentiality extends to the rending of the award.265However, 
CAS does not presume the awards of its Appeals Division as being confidential; hence, 
this paper argues that the contrasting presumptions of confidentiality between the awards 
of CAS’s Ordinary and Appeals Divisions are not justified, as discussed next. 
1 CAS Code on confidentiality 
 
  
260  Christian Bühring-Uhle “A Survey On Arbitration And Settlement In International Business 
Disputes: Advantages of Arbitration” in Christopher R Drahozal and Richard W Naimark (eds) 
Towards a Science of International Arbitration: Collected Empirical Research (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2005) 25 at 32. 
261  Russell v Russell (1880) LR 14 Ch D 471 (Ch) at 474. 
262  Gary B Born “Confidentiality and Transparency in International Arbitration” in International 
Arbitration: Law and Practice (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2012) 195 at 195. 
263  At 195. 
264  Compare ICC Court Arbitration Rules, above n 183, at Appendix I art 6 and Appendix II art 1. 
265  Compare International Centre For Settlement Of Investment Disputes “Rules of Procedure for 
Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules)” <www.icsid.worldbank.org> at r 48. 
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In its Statutes (at the outset), the CAS Code provides:266 
 
CAS arbitrators and mediators are bound by the duty of confidentiality, which is 
provided for in the Code and in particular shall not disclose to any third party any 
facts or other information relating to proceedings conducted before CAS. 
 
However, the CAS Code proceeds to distinguish in its Procedural Rules the duty of 
confidentiality between those arbitrations initiated in CAS’s Ordinary Division from the 
other arbitrations initiated in its Appeals Division. For the Ordinary Division, the Code 
states:267 
 
Proceedings under these Procedural Rules are confidential. The parties, the 
arbitrators and CAS undertake not to disclose to any third party any facts or other 
information relating to the dispute or the proceedings without the permission of 
CAS. Awards shall not be made public unless all parties agree or the Division 
President so decides. 
 
For the Appeals Division, the Code states:268 
 
The award, a summary and/or a press release setting forth the results of the 
proceedings shall be made public by CAS, unless both parties agree that they should 
remain confidential. In any event, the other elements of the case record shall remain 
confidential. 
 
From the above, it is impossible not to recognise the inconsistency in the text of the CAS 
Code when dealing with the question of confidentiality. The Statutes’ ‘proclamation’ 
forbids one to disclose any information relating to proceedings; whereas in the Ordinary 
Division a distinction emerges because it forbids one to disclose any information relating 
to the proceedings or the dispute. In the Appeals Division the phrase “other elements of 
  
266  CAS Code, above n 45, at S19. 
267  At R43. 
268  At R59. 
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the case record” is used, which can only be assumed to have the same meaning as that 
found in the Ordinary Division (or, conversely, perhaps the meaning as found in the 
Statutes).  
 
Moreover, one would assume that “any information” not to be disclosed would include 
the award of arbitration; but, apparently, the arbitral award is treated as a separate 
phenomenon altogether that does not fall within the “any information” bracket. This can 
be seen from the wording of the Ordinary Division definition, which has a separate 
sentence stating that the arbitral awards are presumed to be private. But, even more 
surprisingly, this is additionally proven by the very important reversal of presumption — 
if a dispute in question is an appeal from another sports tribunal’s decision, then the 
award (or its summary and/or press release) is presumed to be public. Hence, unless both 
parties agree for the award to remain confidential  — a rarity in practice — the award is 
distributed to the world.269 This is definitely in contrast to CAS’s own Ordinary Division 
procedure and it is in stark contrast to the duty of confidentiality principle in arbitration. 
 
The big question arises whether CAS is justified in its discrimination of awards between 
Ordinary and Appeals Divisions.  
2 Are CAS’s confidentiality rules justified? 
 
One strong argument to make the awards public is to ensure that the sports law is 
developed in a consistent manner.270 Generally speaking, consistency in law is certainly 
an important goal. However, it must not be forgotten that there is no equivalent stare 
decisis doctrine (legal compulsion) as there is in the common law.271 Hence, even if the 
awards are published, there is no guarantee that arbitral tribunals will follow the decisions 
  
269  Christian Krähe “The Appeals Procedure Before The CAS” in Ian S Blackshaw, Robert C R 
Siekmann and Janwillem Soek (eds) The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004 (TMC Asser 
Press, The Hague, 2006) 99 at 103. 
270  Rigozzi, Hasler and Noth, above n 1, at [18]. 
271  Nafziger, above n 22, at xxiii and xxxii; and see also Annie Bersagel “Is There a Stare Decisis 
Doctrine in the Court of Arbitration for Sport? An Analysis of Published Awards for Anti-Doping 
Disputes in Track and Field” (2012) 12 Pepp Disp Resol LJ 189. 
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of others. In particular, there is nothing in the CAS Code obliging their arbitrators to 
consider other awards when coming to their decision. Moreover, there is some evidence 
showing that even the IOC has not always followed CAS precedent:272  
 
In 2009 the IOC decided not to award a gold medal to silver medalist Katrina 
Thanou of Greece that the sprinter Marion Jones had won at the 2000 Games in 
Sydney but had to forfeit. The IOC’s decision was based on Thanou’s own 
disqualification from the 2004 Games in Athens. This rationale did not follow CAS 
precedent that had limited such a denial of a forfeited medal to only those athletes 
who had tested positive in the same Games. 
 
Another reason for the publicity is the strong public interest in the cases that are resolved 
by CAS in its Appeals Division because most of these disputes are disciplinary in their 
nature,273 many of them related to doping.274 The public interest argument is 
acknowledged, but the same public interest argument may be present in the cases that 
CAS resolves in its Ordinary Division. Even if it is proved that more of the disputes heard 
in the Appeals Division are in the interest of the public, there is no reason for 
discrimination on that ground alone, especially when the disputing parties’ right to 
arbitral privacy and confidentiality is at stake. 
3 Recommendations 
 
Once an arbitrator’s award is challenged in national courts, the individual party in a 
dispute waives its rights to privacy and confidentiality because the court is open to the 
public by its very nature. However, CAS is not a national court. This paper suggests that 
despite the dispute being an appeal of another sports-governing body’s decision, CAS 
should retain the parties’ right to privacy and confidentiality because the Appeals 
Division is still meant to be arbitration. Even if the public has higher interest in the 
appeals decisions, the public should not turn what is in its nature arbitration into 
litigation.  
  
272  At xxxii (emphasis in original). 
273  See Kaufmann-Kohler and Bärtsch, above n 211, at 97. 
274  See Paulsson, above n 115, at 40; and see Krähe, above n 269, at 99. 
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As such, it is strongly encouraged that CAS does not presume its Appeals Division’s 
awards public, but presume them to be confidential. This would be consistent with the 
duty of confidentiality and its own Ordinary Division practice. 
 
If, however, it is necessary to make certain awards public in the hope of developing 
sports law, the CAS Code could add that the parties are encouraged to make their awards 
public in the interests of the law. For instance, an arbitral tribunal could advise the parties 
that their award would prove useful if it were made public for a number of reasons, and 
the parties could then consent to it being made public subject to the conditions they might 
impose on the award (eg deleting names or other private information). Arguably, such 
encouraging approach could be used for both Ordinary and Appeals Divisions of CAS. 
G Ad Hoc Division 
 
This section is specific to CAS’s ad hoc division because the need for speedy dispute 
resolution is greater in disputes related to the Olympic Games.275 As such, the various 
features of CAS discussed thus far could potentially be compromised in certain respects.  
 
The exclusive jurisdiction of CAS to arbitrate Olympic disputes is sourced from the 
Olympic Charter, from which party consent to arbitration must have been accordingly 
found.276 Arbitration is clearly imposed because the alternative is no participation in the 
Olympic Games if the agreement is not signed. Consistently with this paper’s 
recommendation, an attenuated form of consent is still present if one is informed of the 
arbitration clause.277 However, criticism of party consent in sports should not be 
forgotten: former CAS arbitrator doubted whether athletes’ consent to Olympic Games is 
  
275  See Part II.C: Overview of CAS at 13–14. 
276  Ad Hoc Rules, above n 47, at art 1; and Olympic Charter, above n 13, at r 61. 
277  See Part IV.A.5: Recommendation at 28–29. 
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real and genuine, thus believing that an athlete can ‘renege’ on the arbitration agreement 
with legal impunity.278 
 
The issue of CAS’s independence and impartiality becomes much more obvious in the 
Olympic Games because disputes are brought by dissatisfied athletes against the 
decisions of their sports-governing bodies, or more commonly against the IOC or NOC 
(or ANOC collectively); the Olympic Committees are the defendants in CAS ad hoc 
proceedings.279 
 
CAS’s arbitrators for ad hoc proceedings are especially appointed by ICAS for the 
Games, which, arguably, is a necessary compromise because there is a real need for the 
individuals to be present at the Games and be available at all times.280 Hence, the closed 
list scheme may apply to the ad hoc division; however, the recommendation that the list 
should state which organisations proposed which arbitrators still stands.281 This 
recommendation in favour of transparency is even stronger for ad hoc division because 
disputing parties do not get a chance to choose their arbitrators, instead the President of 
the ad hoc division appoints arbitrators once a dispute is submitted.282 
 
Such arrangement further highlights the need for adequate enforcement against arbitrator-
counsel role-switching to uphold the impartiality of arbitrators, and the need for CAS to 
be institutionally independent from the Olympic Committees.283 It is true that CAS has 
been deciding certain cases against the IOC that might prove its institutional 
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independence,284 but the number of decisions dismissing cases in favour of the Olympic 
Committees is very high in comparison.285 
 
The fact that the seat of arbitration is Lausanne, Switzerland is, arguably, another 
legitimate compromise because there might not be much time for the parties to come to 
an agreement. Fortunately, the ad hoc rules expressly state that arbitration is governed by 
PILS (as opposed to the possible application of CPC for Swiss sports disputants):286 a 
rule that should apply in both CAS’s Ordinary and Appeals Divisions also, as 
recommended above.287 However, the arbitral decision “is enforceable immediately and 
may not be appealed against or otherwise challenged”, meaning that the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal is not as involved in CAS ad hoc awards as it is in the awards of its other 
divisions.288 
 
There is nothing express in the ad hoc rules on whether the award made is presumed to be 
public or private. The practice is that there are a lot of ad hoc cases published by CAS, 
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Robert Ellicott, Jan Paulsson, Dirk-Reiner Martens OG 00/005, 19 September 2000. 
285  Compare Andreea Raducan v International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Award) CAS Tricia 
Kavanagh, Stephan Netzle, Maidie Oliveau OG 00/011, 28 September 2000; compare Arturo 
Miranda v International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Award) CAS Robert Ellicott, Jan Paulsson, 
Dirk-Reiner Martens OG 00/003, 13 September 2000; compare Arturo Miranda v International 
Olympic Committee (IOC) (Award) CAS Robert Ellicott, Jan Paulsson, Dirk-Reiner Martens OG 
00/008, 24 September 2000; compare Dieter Baumann v International Olympic Committee (IOC), 
National Olympic Committee of Germany and International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) 
(Award) CAS Tricia Kavanagh, Richard McLaren, Richard Young OG 00/006, 22 September 
2000; compare Bassani-Antivari v International Olympic Committee (IOC) (Award) CAS Yves 
Fortier, Dirk-Reiner Martens, Maidie Oliveau OG 02/003, 12 February 2002; compare United 
States Olympic Committee (USOC) and USA Canoe/Kayak v International Olympic Committee 
(IOC) (Award) CAS Robert Ellicott, Jan Paulsson, Dirk-Reiner Martens OG 00/001, 13 September 
2000; and compare Moldova National Olympic Committee (MNOC) v International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) (Award) CAS Deon H Van Zyl, Jingzhou Tao, Luigi Fumagalli OG 08/006, 9 
August 2008. 
286  Ad Hoc Rules, above n 47, at art 7. 
287  See Part IV.E.3: Recommendations at 53. 
288  Ad Hoc Rules, above n 47, at art 21 (emphasis added). 
61 VIKTORIYA PASHORINA-NICHOLS LAWS 521 
presumably because CAS ad hoc proceedings are a form of an appellate review of the 
sports-governing bodies’ decisions.289 Hence, similar to CAS’s Appeals Division, the 
award is presumed public.  
 
On the one hand, consistently with the recommendation set in the paper, it is best if the 
duty to confidentiality is preserved and, thus, ad hoc awards are presumed private.290 On 
the other hand, however, there are certain features of ad hoc proceedings — such as the 
fact that the Olympic Committees are defendants and the President as opposed to the 
parties appoints CAS arbitrators — highlight the need for transparency, suggesting the 
awards should be presumed public. But athletes cannot challenge the award, as recently 
mentioned, rendering the whole idea of publicity somewhat useless because it seems as if 
the only value of public ad hoc awards is academic criticism of the decisions.291 
 
Overall, this section attempted to show that there is a big difference between CAS’s 
Ordinary and Appeals Divisions and its ad hoc division. In the latter speed is crucial, 
suggesting that certain features found in arbitration beneficial to sports disputants might 
be compromised in the name of a speedy dispute resolution.  
H Enforcement of Awards 
 
This section is relatively short because enforcement of awards is a task left to the 
disputing parties rather than a feature of CAS. Nevertheless, this section is important in 
emphasising how vital it is that the features of CAS’s arbitral procedure reflect arbitration 
and, hence, offer the benefits of arbitration to sports disputants.  
 
Arbitral awards in other contexts — such as commercial or investment international 
arbitration — are typically enforced in national State courts via the use of the New York 
Convention, which has already been accepted by many governments around the world 
  
289  See TAS/CAS “Case Law Documents” <www.jurisprudence.tas-cas.org>. 
290  See Part IV.F.3: Recommendations at 57–58. 
291  See Part IV.G: Ad Hoc Division at 60. 
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(noted earlier).292 Thus, it sounds somewhat odd that in a sports context the ‘stronger 
party’ can use its power, sometimes even monopolistic power, to force the ‘weaker 
party’s’ compliance with the award via internal means (eg contract or licence). It seems 
even more unjust if the latter actually ‘won’ in the arbitral proceeding, but does not have 
the same power to enforce the award via internal means; and, hence, the ‘weaker party’ 
(like an athlete) would actually have to resort to national courts to ensure compliance 
with the award. 
 
In essence, enforcement of an award is generally desirable, even if the route is internal, 
because it gives effect to the parties’ wish to have a dispute resolved through arbitration. 
However, if internal enforcement is used, it becomes much more crucial that the 
traditional elements of arbitration are preserved and, hence, the many advantages of 
arbitration are offered to sports disputants. Specifically to CAS arbitration, because the 
Olympic Committees have, for instance, the power to revoke licences of athletes, it 
becomes so much more important that CAS is institutionally independent, impartial, and 
preserves the parties’ rights to autonomy, mutual consent and confidentiality as much as 
possible.  
 
V Conclusion 
 
From the outset of this conclusion it must be highlighted that CAS deserves to be called 
the supreme court of world sport because, to state concisely, there is no other institution 
like it. In the very complex world of sport, CAS has proved its significance and value in 
resolving sports-related disputes since its operations began in 1984. This paper, however, 
does argue that it is vital that CAS lives up to its own name as the Court of Arbitration 
because arbitration is the preferred method of dispute resolution for sports disputes, as a 
result of its many advantages to sports people and sports organisations. As such, 
arbitration deserves a gold medal. 
 
  
292  See Part III.B.3: Fortius/Stronger at 20. 
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In order to answer the overall question of the paper — is CAS really arbitration — it 
would be wrong to conclude categorically that CAS is not arbitration, instead it is evident 
that CAS’s arbitral procedure does capture certain of its elements. However, with the 
erosion of the confidentiality principle, for instance, due to a presumption of a public 
award in CAS’s Appeal Division, a feature of litigation is strongly evident. Hence, 
because CAS may reflect arbitration better in certain instances, there is room for 
improvement. 
 
The benefits of arbitration to sports disputants should be at the forefront whenever CAS’s 
rules are designed. Throughout this paper various changes to CAS’s rules have been 
discussed in the form of recommendations, which attempt to protect the interests of sports 
disputants in arbitration, with the ulterior motive and hope to help CAS maintain its title 
as the supreme court of world sport. 
 
It is clear that CAS’s divisions have different roles and functions and those differences 
must be kept in mind. Nevertheless, CAS is meant to be an arbitral tribunal, thus it is 
best if elementary features of arbitration are retained unless, of course, there are 
circumstances that justify a different treatment. For instance, CAS’s ad hoc division 
would only function if speed of dispute resolution were the most significant principle, 
suggesting that a compromise of certain benefits of arbitration is not an unreasonable 
trade-off. Similar compromises, however, are not always justified in the other two 
divisions. In particular, it is not necessary to presume the awards of the Appeals Division 
public for the division to work effectively because sports disputants are still likely to 
appeal whether or not there is public interest in the particular decisions; hence, the party’s 
right to confidentiality should be respected. In fact, it would be most unfortunate if sports 
disputants were dissuaded from bringing their claims to CAS for the fear of their 
information being released. 
 
There are other elements and features of CAS’s arbitral procedure that could be improved 
for the benefit of all sports disputants. Party consent to arbitration is an element that gives 
arbitration its validity; thus, informed consent of a sports disputant should at least be 
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sought before jurisdiction of the arbitral panel is established. Party autonomy is another 
fundamental feature of arbitration that could be enhanced if CAS’s seat were not 
Switzerland for every single CAS dispute, but instead party agreement were sought on 
the matter. Arguably, however, ad hoc proceedings are justified in having Switzerland as 
their automatic seat on the ground that speed of dispute resolution is so important to the 
functioning of the whole division.  
 
CAS should be applauded for proving that it can change its practices following criticism 
of its lack of independence or impartiality: there have been positive changes to the 
framework and rules of CAS, but, as this paper attempted to show, there is room left to 
evolve further. Specifically, it is incredibly important that the Olympic Committees’ 
influence over CAS should be better repelled by ICAS — the intermediary that was 
originally meant to take over CAS’s affairs from the IOC following the Gundel judgment. 
In particular, the fact that the Olympic Committees still retain some influence over the 
appointment of CAS arbitrators is problematic; thus, removing the closed list of 
arbitrators could assist in reducing the appearance of arbitrators’ lack of independence 
and impartiality. If such change is not implemented, ICAS could at least publish the 
closed list with information showing which organisation proposed the appointment of the 
particular arbitrator. In addition, the new rule prohibiting arbitrator-counsel role-
switching must have an adequate enforcement mechanism introduced because at the 
moment the rule has no ‘teeth to bite with’. 
 
Even if the recommendations discussed in this paper are not implemented, it is sincerely 
hoped that CAS’s arbitral procedures are amended in other ways, believed to be more 
appropriate, in order to reflect arbitration much better. If so, the answer in the future to 
the question posed whether or not CAS is really arbitration would be much shorter — 
‘yes’. 
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VI Appendix 1: Simplified Organisation of World Sport and New Zealand 
Rugby Union Example 
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